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PREFACE 
Risk management is a concept and a practice that is relatively new to  
t h e  field of road sa fe ty .  Although the systematic analysis of an 
organizationts operations to identify risks and select treatments for them 
is common in the world of business, it has only recently begun to be 
undertaken by road authorities. However, as increasing insurance 
premiums make it more difficult for road authorities to transfer the risk 
of loss to an insurer, road safety risk management is likely to expand and 
develop, 
The purpose of these two volumes is to provide a background and a 
starting point for road safety risk management programs in Michigan. 
Volume I is intended to provide an introduction to risk management 
theory as it applies to road safety and an introduction to road liability 
law, as a background for the development of a risk management program. 
Volume I1 provides additional legal background in the form of summaries 
of cases involving road safety in Michigan. 
These volumes have been prepared on the premise that the law of 
road liability plays an essential role in a road safety risk management 
program. There are three ways in which this is t rue .  F i r s t ,  as a 
practical matter, a concern about liability is often the impetus for safety 
decisions. At the same time, a concern about liability can also inhibit 
the making of safety decisions, Finally, however, legal considerations 
should be neither a driving nor a restraining force in a risk management 
program. Rather, they should be a source of information and a guide for 
decision-making. Lawsuits can inform the road authority of facts or 
conditions that involve risks of injury to users of the road. The reported 
court decisions and the statutes also provide guidelines as t o  what 
conduct or results are expected of the road authority in dealing with 
those risks. 
T h e  purpose of these  volumes, then, is t o  provide a general  
v i i  
introduction to the law relating to road authorities and their operations. 
They are not intended to provide legal advice. That can only be done by 
counsel as specific legal questions arise. It is hoped that the materials in 
these volumes will acquaint the reader with general principles of road 
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MICHIGAN ROAD LIABILITY CASES 
INTRODUCTION 
S c o p e  o f  the C o l l e c t i o n  
This volume contains summaries of selected Michigan cases on the law 
of road liability. Cases decided before 1879 (when the predecessor to the 
current liability law was enacted) are omitted. Cases that do not involve 
road liability are not included, even when a road authority is a defendant. 
Cases that stand for principles of law that are no longer valid are also 
omitted. Since this volume is concerned with road authority liability, 
issues not related to that (such as procedural questions) are generally not 
discussed. 
On the other  hand, even though the s tate  and the county road 
commissions are not liable for sidewalks, some sidewalk cases contain 
statements of law that also apply to roads (such as liability for snow and 
ice). These cases are therefore included in order to present  their  
principles of law (which a re  the same as in road liability) and to 
illustrate possible fact situations including pedestr ians tha t  a road 
authority may face. For these reasons the reader should not make the 
mistake of ignoring the sidewalk cases merely because the state or county 
road commissions are not responsible for side walks. 
Some editing of the collection has been done to avoid unnecessary 
repetition of cases standing for the same principle, but in general the' 
collection tends toward completeness even at the expense of repetition. 
C o n t e n t s  o f  Summaries  
The summaries contain seven major sections under the following 
headings : 
1. D e f e c t  describes the particular problem with the road as 
reported in the case. 
2 .  Accident describes the events and plaintiff's encounter with the 
defect that gave rise to the litigation. 
3 .  Injury states plaintiff's injury if the case reports it, 
4.  Legal Issues sets forth the legal issues raised in the case and 
the resolution of the issues made by the court. This section is 
subdivided into two additional sect ions:  N e g l i g e n c e  and 
Defenses.  In each subsection the specific issue dealt with under 
the heading is set out. Wherever the court stated the opposing 
views of the parties, this controversy is stated in the summary. 
There is one exception, specifically, "No Noticefs. The issue of 
whether the road authority had notice of the defect occurs so 
often that the phrase "No Noticeu is used as an abbreviation for 
the statement "The defendant claimed it did not have notice of 
the defect-in response plaintiff claimed that the def endent did 
have notice of the defectM. 
Whenever the court commented on an issue without stating the 
opposing views of the parties, the comment is headed with a 
nbulletv plus a word or phrase simply categorizing the comment. 
5. Result states the specific legal disposition of the case. 
6 .  C o m m e n t  contains statements intended to highlight certain 
aspects of the case that a lay reader might pass over;  to  
correct any misstatement of the law made by the court; and to 
report any points of the case that do not fit efficiently into the 
body of the summary. 
7 .  Ci ta t ion  states the volume and page references for the ful l  
court opinion. 
If the court's opinion is unclear or ambiguous, or its treatment of a 
problem is incomplete, the summary does not attempt to correct the 
opinion. Nor are conflicts between the cases reconciled. How to apply 
the law to a given problem is left to the reader in  consultation with 
counsel. Where, however, the law as stated by the court has changed or 
is plainly wrong, this has been noted in the Comments section of the 
summary. Only material relevant to road liability in principles of law, 
facts, or evidence is contained in the summary. All other mater ia l  
contained in the case has been omitted. 
The summaries are arranged chronologically, from more remote to 
more recent. The reader will thus know that the higher a page number, 
the more modern the case. 
The abbreviation l1keep/maintain" is used to refer to the authority's 
duty under MCLA 691.1402, that is, lf. . . to keep any highway under i ts  
jurisdiction in reasonable repair, and in condition reasonably safe and fit 
for travel, . . . 11 
Each case summary contains a brief notation in the upper right hand 
corner of the summary indicating the operating area of the road authority 
whose activities are most likely to be involved in the litigation. 
Other Materials 
In addition to the case summaries this volume contains the following 
materials: 
1. Three indexes to provide easy access to the case summaries. 
The first is an index of roadway features and conditions and 
activities associated with them (e.g., "Bridges, signing off'). The 
second is an index to legal principles (e.g., llNotice of effect,  
employee knowledgev). The third index lists cases according to 
the road authority functional divisions most likely to be involved 
in the facts of that case. 
2 .  A glossary of legal terms and description of legal procedures. 
Every effort has been made to eliminate l l legaleseu and to 
t r ans l a t e  legal  phrases into ordinary English. For some 
concepts, however, no method exists to report accurately the 
court's statements or handling of a case without using a legal 
phrase (e.g., summary judgment; question of fact for the jury's 
decision) or writing a lengthy explanation in the summary itself. 
These terms and procedures are described in the glossary and 
accompanying  legal  mater ials ,  which should be used i n  
conjunction with this volume. 

GLOSSARY 
This glossary contains commonly used legal terms. Whenever possible, 
the definitions of those terms relate to road liability law. Words in any 
definition in boldface are defined elsewhere in the glossary. 
Accelerated judgment 
When a defendant is sued, it may be able to raise certain special 
defenses. These defenses are listed in one of the rules of general 
court procedure. The essence of each of them is that even though 
the plaintiff may have a legitimate grievance, the defendant cannot be 
sued. Examples of this include: the s t a t u t e  of l imi ta t ions  has 
expired or the court lacks jurisdiction over the parties or the subject 
matter of the case. When accelerated judgment is granted by a judge, 
the case is terminated and the plaintiff loses without a trial. 
Admissible/inadmissible 
Evidence offered at  a trial may be either admissible or inadmissible. 
Admissible evidence is evidence that is proper for a jury to hear. 
Inadmissible evidence should be screened out by the judge, if one of 
the attorneys raises the proper objection. There are many reasons 
why evidence might not be admissible. For example, it might be 
hearsay, or irrelevant, or might express an opinion rather than s tate  a 
fact. 
Affirm 
When a case is appealed, if the appellate court agrees with the result 
reached in the trial court, it will affirm its judgment. 
Bar a suit 
A suit is barred when it cannot be brought. This term is usually 
applied when a suit has merit but there is a special defense to it 
(such as the expiration of the s tatute  of limitations). When a 
defendant has such a defense, he will ask for acce le ra t ed  judgment. 
If the court grants accelerated judgment it will be on the basis that 
the suit is barred by the special defense. The term can also be 
applied to any defense that defeats a plaintiff's claim such as payment 
of a debt, or until recently, contributory negligence. 
Burden of proof 
In a trial, each party is required to prove certain facts. For example, 
the plaintiff in a lawsuit against a road authority must prove that the 
road was not reasonably safe. This requires that he establish it was 
defective by a preponderance of the evidence, which means that it 
must be more likely than not that the road was defective. If the 
evidence is evenly balanced the defendant wins. Preponderance of the 
evidence may be contrasted with the higher standard of proof in a 
criminal case, beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Comparative negligence 
See Contributory negligence. 
Constructive not ice 
The s t a tu t e  creating road authority liability provides that a road 
authority is not liable unless it "knew, or in the exercise of reasonable 
diligence should have known, of the existence of the defect and had a 
reasonable time to repairft it. This requirement as the statute says, 
can be satisfied by actual notice or by constructive notice. Actual 
notice exists when an employee of the road authority in fact knows of 
the defect . Constructive notice occurs when the authority should have 
known of the defect, either because the defect had existed for a 
suf f ic ien t  period of t ime or because i t s  employees had actual 
knowledge of fact that suggests the need for investigation. In either 
of these situations, the court will construe that the road authority had 
the legally required notice. 
Contributory negligence 
When a person is careless in looking after his own safety and that 
carelessness is a cause of his injury, he is contributorily negligent. 
Until 1979, the rule in  Michigan was that if a person's negligence 
contributed i n  any way to his injury, he could not collect anything 
from the defendant even though the defendant's negligence was 
greater. Under the new rule, called comparat ive negl igence ,  a 
person's contributory negligence does not bar his claim, but merely 
reduces his damages in proportion to his fault. 
Court of Claims 
One of the oldest rules of law is that a state cannot be sued unless it 
consents. The state of Michigan consented to be sued for certain 
types of claims, but required that the claims be brought in a specified 
court, called the the Court of Claims. In fact the Court of Claims 
was very much like the circuit courts, except that it heard only 
claims against the s tate  and did not have juries. Beginning in 1979, 
the Court of Claims was abolished as a sepa ra te  court  and i t s  
functions were transferred to the Ingham County Circuit Court. The 
Department of State Highways is sued in the Court of Claims. 
Circuit court 
The circuit courts are courts of general jurisdiction, which means they 
handle all claims that are not by statute put within the jurisdiction of 
other courts. The circuit court's jurisdiction includes all criminal 
cases where the penalty exceeds one year's imprisonment, all civil 
cases where the amount claimed exceeds $10,000, and all claims for 
special relief (such as injunctions). Circuit courts a re  generally 
organized on a single county basis, although in the northern part of 
the state circuits may include two or more counties. 
Damage 
In law, the term damage is used to refer to the actual loss (e.g., a 
broken leg or a broken windshield) suffered because of a legal injury. 
Damage is distinguished from damages, which means the money 
awarded to the injured person in compensation for his damage. 
Damages 
In law, the term damages refers to the money awarded to a plaintiff 
to compensate for the damage (loss) suffered. 
Decision 
The actual disposition made of a case by an appellate court is called 
a decision. The reasons for the decision are expressed in a written 
opinion, and the decision itself is stated at the end of the opinion. 
The decision of a court will usually do one of three things: aff i rm 
the lower court, remand the case for a new trial, or remand the case 
for entry of a different judgment. 
Defect 
The road liability statutes require the road authorities to provide 
reasonably safe roads. These statutes refer to any condition that 
makes a road not reasonably safe as a defect. 
Directed verdict 
At the end of a jury trial the judge may believe that the evidence 
presented makes it clear that one or the other party is entitled to 
win. If so, he may direct the jury to reach a certain verd ic t .  This 
power is seldom used, because there is a very strong policy in favor 
of jury trials. 
Dismiss a case 
When a lawsuit is filed, the defendant may ask the judge to grant 
accelerated judgment or summary judgment in his favor. If the 
judge decides to grant either of those, then plaintiff loses his case 
without a trial. This is known as dismissing a case. Cases can also 
be dismissed for other reasons such as failure to comply with court 
rules,  
Due process of law 
The federal and s ta te  constitutions guarantee the right to due process 
of law. While the precise meaning of this term has become complex, 
in essence it requires that trials and hearings be conducted according 
to a fair procedure (procedural due process) and that laws themselves 
be fair (substantive due process). The sixty-day notification provision 
of the road liability laws was held invalid as a violation of due process. 
Equal protection of the law 
The federal and s tate  constitutions guarantee equal protection of the 
law. As the term suggests, this requires that laws treat persons in 
similar circumstances equally. The fact that persons suing the state 
had more requirements to meet than those suing any other defendant 
was one basis for the supreme court's decision to hold the sixty-day 
notification of the road liability statutes unconstitutional. 
Expert testimony 
Some evidence presented a t  a trial is written, but most is oral 
(testimony). Ordinarily, witnesses are permitted to testify only to 
fac ts  and may not express their opinion. An expert, however, because 
of his knowledge in a field beyond that of laymen, can give an 
opinion, Thus, a doctor can give his opinion as to the cause of death, 
and an engineer can testify as to the safety of a certain design. 
Finding of fact  
Every case is decided by applying the law to the facts. In simple 
t e rms ,  "finding the factstt in  a case answers the question, "What 
happened?" In a jury trial the jury finds (decides upon) the facts and 
reaches a verdict .  If there is no jury the judge finds the facts and 
states them in writing. Except in rare cases, an appellate court will 
not question a finding of fact made in trial. 
Injury 
In law, the term injury in its strict  sense, means the invasion of a 
legal right. Thus, a property owner is injured by the trespass of 
someone who steps on his land, even if it causes no actual damage 
(loss). In practice, the terms injury and damage a re  of ten  used 
interchangeably to mean with injury referring to persons, and 
damage to property. The term for the compensation received by a 
successful plaintiff is damages. 
Judgment 
A judgement is the court's final determination of who won the case. 
After the trial is over and the jury expresses its verd ic t ,  the verdict 
is translated into a judgment, which is usually a statement that the 
defendant wins or that the defendant loses and must pay a certain 
amount to the plaintiff. The losing party usually has twenty.days to 
appeal a judgment. 
Jurisdiction (of a court) 
The term jurisdiction can be roughly translated as power or authority. 
There are two kinds of jurisdiction a court must have to hear a case. 
First, it must have jurisdiction over that type of case (e.g., for a 
circuit court, a case involving more than $10,000). It must also have 
jurisdiction over the parties (i.e., the defendant must have been 
properly served with notice of the proceedings). 
Jurisdiction (of a road authority) 
In general, the term jurisdiction means power or authority. As to 
road authorities, it refers to those roads that they have the right and 
the responsibility to maintain. For county road commissions, 
jurisdiction extends to all county roads within the geographical limits 
of the county. 
Jury instructions 
When the parties in a jury trial finish presenting their evidence, the 
jury weighs the evidence and reaches a verd ic t .  In doing this the 
jury applies the law to the facts of the case. It learns the facts 
from hearing evidence. It learns the law applicable to the case from 
the judge's jury instructions. 
Matter of law 
In a jury trial, it is the judge's function to explain the law to the 
jury, so that they can decide upon the facts. Occasionally, however, 
it will happen that the facts make it clear that one party or the 
other is entitled to win. Usually this happens when all of the facts, 
even when interpreted in a way most favorable to one party, do not 
support this claim. Then it is said, for example, that the defendant 
was (or was not) negligent as a matter of law. The result of this 
determination by the judge is that the trial ends without a decision by 
the jury. 
Negligence 
Negligence is a legal basis for a lawsuit for money damages. It can 
roughly be translated as carelessness. it can be broken down into four 
elements: 1) a duty to use reasonable care to avoid an unreasonable 
' risk of injury to another; 2)  which is breached by the failure to use 
care; 3 )  the breach being a proximate cause; 4) of damage (to person 
or property). Although a road authority 's  s t a tu to ry  l iabili ty is 
different from negligence in that its duty is to provide roads that are 
reasonably safe (rather than use reasonable care to do so), the two are 
quite similar and are often treated by the courts as being the same. 
Notice 
In the area of road liability, notice refers to the statutory requirement 
that a road commission know or have reason to know of a defect. A 
road authority is considered to have notice of a defect if any of its 
employees knows of it, or if it has existed for more than 30  days. 
Although notice is sometimes used to mean notification, that term 
refers to the statutory requirement that an injured person notify the 
road authority of the accident within 120 days. 
Notification 
Notification refers to the requirement that an injured person notify 
the appropriate road authority of the time and place of accident, the 
nature of the defect, and the names of any witnesses, within 120 days 
of the accident. Until recently, the law provided that any failure to 
comply with this requirement barred the plaintiff's claim. The rule 
now is that it bars his claim only if the flaw in the notification 
prejudices the defendant. Notification should be contrasted with 
notice, which refers to the road authority's knowledge of a defect in 
a road, 
Opinion 
When an appellate court hears a case, it writes an opinion. The 
opinion states the reasons for the court's decision, and expresses the 
decision itself. Opinions of the court of appeals and the supreme 
court are regularly reported (printed and bound in book form) for use 
in deciding later cases. 
Prejudice 
In law, the term prejudice is used to describe the situation in which a 
party to a lawsuit is put at an unfair disadvantage. Prejudice can be 
caused by any number of things, such as an incorrect ruling by a judge 
in the course of a trial, or some conduct of the opposite party or his 
counsel. Refusal to supply relevant evidence might prejudice the 
opposite party. In the area of road liability, the issue of prejudice 
most often arises when the plaintiff failed in some way to comply 
with the statutory notification requirement. 
Preponderance of the evidence 
See Burden of proof. 
Presumption 
A presumption is a fact inferred from another fact. For example, the 
fact that a man is a woman's husband creates a presumption that he 
is the father of her child. Most presumptions are rebuttable, which 
means they can be disproved by contrary facts. However, another 
type of presumption, the conclusive presumption, cannot be rebutted, 
even if there are contrary facts. In the area of road liability a road 
authority is conclusively presumed to have knowledge of any defect 
that has existed for more than thirty days. 
Remand 
When an appellate court makes a decision in a case, it either affirms 
or reverses the lower court's decision. If it  affirms it,  nothing more 
need be done, and the t r i a l  court  can proceed to  enforce its 
judgment. If the appellate court reverses the lower court, i t  will 
remand the case with directions either that the trial court hold a new 
trial or modify its judgment. 
Subsequent repair 
If a road authority is sued on the basis of an alleged defect in a road, 
and it makes repairs to the road, the plaintiff would like to be able 
to use that subsequent repair to show that there was a defect. In 
order to encourage the making of needed repair, the general rule is 
that subsequent repairs are not admissible. However, there are some 
significant exceptions to this rule. Subsequent repairs can be used as 
evidence if the defendant denies ownership, control, or feasibility of 
taking measures to correct the defect. 
Summary judgment 
When a defendant is sued, it may believe that the plaintiff does not 
have a legitimate claim, even if all of the facts the plaintiff alleges 
are true. For example, a lawsuit that claimed only that the road was 
slippery because of snow does not s ta te  a basis for liability. When 
this happens, the defendant will ask the court for summary judgment. 
In considering a request for summary judgment, a judge will treat  
every one of plaintiff's claims as true, and will interpret those facts 
favorably to the plaintiff. I f ,  under this test, the defendant is not 
liable as a m a t t e r  of law, then summary judgment will be granted, 
and the case will end without a trial. 
Verdict 
When a jury decides whether the defendant is liable to the plaintiff, 
and if so the amount of money he should pay, it reaches a verdict. 
The verdict is therefore a decision based on findings of fact  (as to 
what happened) and the application of law (as explained to the jury by 
the judge). The judge then expresses the result contained in the 
verdict in a judgment. 
INDEX OF FEATURES/ACTIVITIES 
BARRICADES 
Failure to place 8, 21, 65, 72, 115 
Insufficient 66, 74, 85, 106 
Knocked down 35, 108 
BRIDGES 
Approach to  37, 64, 67, 87 
Barricades 72, 74 
Drawlswing bridges 35, 66, 74 
Guardrails inadequate 5, 87, 138 
Guardrails absent 25, 74 
Holesibreaks in surf ace 2, 5, 18, 34, 39 
Out 72 
Pedestrian walkway 123 
Signing/signalization 72, 160 
Snow and ice on 158, 160, 161 
Support inadequate 9, 31 
Surf ace  
(See SURFACE OF ROAD OR SIDEWALK) 
Other 14 5 
CONSTRUCTION 
Generally 139 
Compliance with design specifications 26, 136 
CONSTRUCTION ZONE 
Pedestrians in 2, 45, 72, 83, 91 
Vehicles in 21, 41, 48, 54,  85, 108, 118, 
124, 153 
CURVES AND HILLS 
Sharplsteep 13 7 
Signing of 137 
DELINEATORS AND WARNING POSTS 
D ESIG N 
Drainage 
Geom etrics generally 
Guardrail 
Pedestrian access 
Snow and ice 
Unspecified 
Width 




Visibility in general 
EXCAVATIONS 
FENCES AND BARRIERS 
Prevent animal access to road 
Prevent pedestrian access to road 



















Traffic volumes a t  
Visibility 
MAINTENANCE 
OBSTACLES BESIDE ROAD 
(See ROADSIDE HAZARDS) 












Access to hazard other than road or 
sidewalk itself 
Associated with disabled vehicle 
On road 
Slip, trip, fall 
PERMITTED ACTIVITIES 
Authorized 





Clear vision agreement 
Signals/signs 











(See SURFACE OF ROAD OR SIDEWALK) 
SHOULDER 





On curves and hills 
Intersections 
Railroad crossing 


























SNOW AND ICE 
Bridges 
Failure to wan 













SURFACE OF ROAD OR SIDEWALK 
Bridges 
(See also BRIDGES, Holeslbreaks in surface) 
Broken 101, U2 
Edges of 39, 69 
Erosion 13, 18, 32, 39,  56,  69,  71, 
73, 77, 78 
Holes and sof t  spots 1, 3, 10, 14, 15, 18, 34, 42,  
43, 46,  65,  68,  70,  80,  81, 
86,  91, 108,  109 ,  111, 117, 
125, 146, 150, 153 
Loose 14, 29, 44, 102 
Manholes 22, 99, 153 
Obstacles on 
(See OBSTACLES ON ROAD OR SIDEWALK) 
Slippery 
mud 
snow and ice 
(See SNOW AND ICE) 
Uneven surface  37, 67, 86, 87, 90 
Water on 6, 75, 92, 147 
TREES, LIMBS, AND VEGETATION 
Collision with 12, 95, 97, l l 7 ,  126, 151 










COMPLIANCE WITH LAW 
As a defense 
MMUTCD 
statutes 
Failure to comply as evidence of negligence 
MMUTCD 149, 154 
s tatutes  7 2 
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 
Drinking/intoxication 16, 22, 70 
Ignore signal/sign 92, ll9, 143 
Inat tention to surroundings 22, 39,  60,  66, 67, 70, 76, 
85, 92, 95, 98, 108 
Jury question 6, 7, 11, 19, 22, 35, 38, 42,  
45, 48,  52,  53, 54,  56, 66, 
67, 69,  70, 76,  77, 86,  91, 
9 3 ,  9 8 ,  102, 108, 118, 159, 
160 
Matter of law 27, 37, 66, 95 
Prior knowledge of defective condition 6 ,  19,  27, 35, 37, 38, 53, 
54, 56, 65,  68,  86,  90, 92, 
102 
Speeding 21, 87, 91, 108 
Trespassing 84, 123 
Other conduct 30, 60, 67, 69, 77 
CUSTOMARY PROCEDURE AND COMPARABLE 






To whom owed 
To anticipate departure from 
travelled way 
IMMUNITY 
IMPROVED PORTION OF HIGHWAY 
INSPECT, DUTY TO 
JURISDICTION 
Maintenance agreements with other 
road authorities 
Multiple 
Private contractor performing work 
Statutory exclusions 
alley 
construction and design 
not improved portion designed for 
vehicular travel 
not open to public 
side walks and crosswalks 
other statutory exclusions 
LACK OF STAFF, FUNDSIALLOCATION OF 
RESOURCES 
NOTICE OF DEFECT 




Evidence not establishing 
Existence for thirty days 
Inspection of road 
Jury question 
43, 78 
9, 18, 31, 3 2 ,  3 4 ,  4 4 ,  71, 
75, 91 
3, 9, 14, 29, 31, 32, 39, 42,  
45, 46, 52,  66,  73, 75, 80, 
98, 104, 109, 123, 129, 147, 
149, 155 
Knowledge of 
agent 10, 155 
contractor 41, 45, 52, 91, 147 
employee/official 10, 11, 14,  40, 41, 44, 46, 
71, 109, 147, 155 
police 46, 89, 104, 106, ll4, 147 
public 1, 15, 31, 71, 91, 104, 123, 
128, 147 
Prior accidentslsim ilar defects 1, 3, 5, 14, 16, 19, 29,  3 5 ,  
60, 64, 108, 149 
Seasonal problems 39, 75, 160 
NOTIFICATION OF INTENT TO SUE 
Constitutionality of ll7, 126, 140, 142, 145 
Insufficient 101, 112 
Late notification 110, 113, ll7, 126, 148 
Prejudice because of l a te  notification 142, 145, 148 
Sufficient 46, 80, 102, 118, 122, 125 
Other improper notification 68, 96 
PERSONAL LIABILITY OF EMPLOYEE OR 
OFFICIAL 2 
PRIOR ACCIDENTS 
As evidence of negligence 7 3 
As evidence of notice of defect  
(See NOTICE OF DEFECT, prior accidents) 
PROXIMATE CAUSE 
(See CAUSATION) 
STATE OF THE ART 
(See CUSTOMARY PROCEDURE and COMPARABLE CONDITIONS) 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
Expired 141, 153 
Wrong s ta tutory  period used 103, 137, 139, 140, 145 
SUBSEQUENT REPAIRS 
Admissibility of 15, 16, 73 
TRAVELED PORTION OF ROAD 
(See IMPROVED PORTION OF HIGHWAY) 
DEPARTMENTAL INDEX 
ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT 
INDEX OF FEATURESIACTIVITIES 
BARRICADES 
Failure to place 21, 65 
Insufficient 66, 106 
Knocked down 3 5 
BRIDGES 
Approach to  37, 64, 67, 87 
Drawlswing bridges 35, 66 
Guardrails inadequate 5, 87 
Guardrails absent 2 5 
Holedbreaks in surface 5, 34 
Pedestrian walkway 123 
Snow and ice on 158, 161 
Support inadequate 9, 31 
Surface 




Compliance with design specifications 26, 136 
CONSTRUCTION ZONE 
Pedestrians in 45, 83 
Vehicles in 21, 118, 153 
CURVES AND HILLS 
Sharp/steep 137 
Signing of 137 
D ESIG N 




Snow and ice 
Unspecified 
Width 





FENCES AND BARRIERS 















OBSTACLES BESIDE ROAD 
(See ROADSIDE HAZARDS) 
OBSTACLES ON ROAD OR SIDEWALK 
Man holes 
Vehicles 106, 160 
Structures 8 3 
Other objects 8 3 
PEDESTRIANS 
Access to hazard other than road or 
sidewalk itself 45, 83, 96, 123, 
Associated with disabled vehicles 15 9 
On road 26, 31, 34, 52, 83, 96 
Slip, trip, fall 26, 44, 45, 62, U8 
PERMITTED ACTIVITIES 
Construction debris on ROW 64 
POLES 107 
RAILROAD CROSSING 
Clear vision agreement 152 
Signalslsigns 15 2 
ROADSIDE HAZARDS 




Trees 12, 97, 126 
Other 2 5 
ROAD SURFACE 
(See SURFACE OF ROAD OR SIDEWALK) 
SHOULDER 










Absence of 79, 100, 158 
Exitlentrance ramps 131 
Railroad crossing 152 
Types of signs 
bridges 15 8 
curve 
ice 15 8 
speed control 9, 137 
stop 100 
warning 131, 158 
yield 
Visibility of 15 8 
SNOW AND ICE 
Bridges 158, 160, 161 
Failure to w a n  92, 158 
Natural or unnatural accumulation 
jury question 5 8 
natural 57, 58, 158 
unnatural 9 2 




SURFACE OF ROAD OR SIDEWALK 
Bridges 
(See also BRIDGES, Holeslbreaks in surface) 
Erosion 32, 77 
Holes and soft spots 34, 43, 65, 86, 153 
Loose 44 
Manholes 15 3 
Obstacles on 
(See OBSTACLES ON ROAD OR SIDEWALK) 
Slippery 
snow and ice 
(See SNOW AND ICE) 
Uneven surface 
Water on 






INDEX OF FEATURES/ACTIVITIES 
BARRICADES 
Failure t o  place 8, 21, 65, 72, U5 
Insufficient 74, 85, 106 
Knocked down 108 
BRIDGES 
Approach t o  37, 64, 67, 87 
Barricades 72, 74 
Drawlswing bridges 74 
Guardrails inadequate 5, 87 
Guardrails absent 7 4 
Holeslbreaks in surface  2, 5, 18, 34, 39 
Out  72 
Signinglsignaliz ation 72, 160 
Snow and ice on 158, 160, 161 
Support inadequate 9 
Surf ace  
(See SURFACE OF ROAD OR SIDEWALK) 
CONSTRUCTION 
Generally 13 9 
Compliance with design specifications 136 
CONSTRUCTION ZONE 
Pedestrians in 2, 72, 83 
Vehicles in 21,41,48,  54, 85,  108, 118, 
124, 153 
DELINEATORS AND WARNING POSTS 115 
DESIGN 




Snow and ice 
Unspecified 
Width 




Visibility in general 
EXCAVATIONS 
FENCES AND BARRIERS 
Prevent animal access to road 















OBSTACLES BESIDE ROAD 
(See ROADSIDE HAZARDS) 












Access to hazard other than road or 
sidewalk itself 
Associated with disabled vehicle 
On road 
Slip, trip, fall 
PERMITTED ACTIVITIES 
Authorized 
















(See SURFACE OF ROAD OR SIDEWALK) 
SHOULDER 





On curves and hills 
Intersections 
Railroad crossing 


















SNOW AND ICE 
Bridges 
Failure to warn 













SURFACE OF ROAD OR SIDEWALK 
Bridges 
(See also BRIDGES, Holes/breaks in surface) 
Broken 101, 112 
Edges of 39, 69 
Erosion 13, 18, 32, 39,  56,  69,  71, 
73, 77, 78 
Holes and sof t  spots 1, 3, 10, 14, 15, 18, 34,  42,  
43, 46, 65, 68,  70,  80,  81, 
86, 108, 109, 111, 117, 1 2 5 ,  
146, 150, 153 
Loose 14, 29, 44, 102 
Manholes 22, 99, 153 
Obstacles on 
(See OBSTACLES ON ROAD OR SIDEWALK) 
Slippery 
mud U 6 
snow and ice 
(See SNOW AND ICE) 
Uneven surface 
Water on 
TREES, LIMBS, AND VEGETATION 
Collision with 





PERMITS AND SPECIAL USES DEPARTMENT 
INDEX OF FEATURESIACTIVITIES 
BARRICADES 
Failure to place 21 
Insufficient 85, 106 
Knocked down 108 
BRIDGES 
Surface 
(See SURFACE OF ROAD OR SIDEWALK) 
CONSTRUCTION 
Generally 13 9 
CONSTRUCTION ZONE 
Pedestrians in 91 
Vehicles in 21, 41, 48, 85, 108, 118 
DESIGN 
Generally 139, 148 
DITCHES, CULVERTS, AND DRAINS 
Guardrails 4 8 
Road over 4 8 
EXCAVATIONS 17, 21, 70, 85, 91, 108 
FENCES AND BARRIERS 
Prevent pedestrian access to hazard 120 
INTERSECTIONS 
Generally 139 
MAINTENANCE 85, 139, 148 
OBSTACLES BESIDE ROAD 
(See ROADSIDE HAZARDS) 







Access to hazard other than road or 
sidewalk itself 
Slip, trip, fall 
PERMITTED ACTIVITIES 
Authorized 










(See SURFACE OF ROAD OR SIDEWALK) 
SHOULDER 








Absence of stop sign 






SURFACE OF ROAD OR SIDEWALK 
Holes and s o f t  spots  3, 10, 14, 15, 46, 70, 91, 108 
Loose 14 
o b s t a c l e s  on 
(See OBSTACLES ON ROAD OR SIDEWALK) 
Slippery 
snow and ice  
(See SNOW AND ICE) 






INDEX O F  FEATURESIACTIVITIES 
BARRICADES 
Failure to  place 21, 65, 72, 115 
Insufficient 66, 74, 85, 106 
Knocked down 35, 108 
BRIDGES 
Approach to  6 4 
Barricades 72, 74 
Draw/swing bridges 35, 66, 74 
Guardrails inadequate 5, 138 
Guardrails absent 25, 74 
Holeslbreaks in surface 5 
Out  72 
Pedestrian walkway 123 
Signinglsignalization 72, 160 
Snow and ice on 158, 160, 161 
Surface 




Pedestrians in 72 
Vehicles in 21, 48, 54, 85, 108, 118 
CURVES AND HILLS 
Sharplsteep 137 
Signing of 137 






Snow and ice 
Unspecified 
Width 





FENCES AND BARRIERS 
Prevent pedestrian access to road 















Traffic volumes a t  
Visibility 
'9 5 
57, 59, 137 
11, 59, 60, 74, 140 
123 
5 7 
131, 139, 148 
59, 82 
MAINTENANCE 
OBSTACLES BESIDE ROAD 
(See ROADSIDE HAZARDS) 







Access to hazard other than road or 
sidewalk itself 
On road 
Slip, trip, fall 
PERMITTED ACTIVITIES 
Authorized 




Clear vision agreement 
Signalslsigns 








0 t her 
ROAD SURFACE 
(See SURFACE OF ROAD OR SIDEWALK) 
SHOULDER 




On curves and hills 
Intersections 
Railroad crossing 

























Visibility of 149, 158 
SNOW AND ICE 
Bridges 158, 160, 161 
Failure to warn 158, 160 
Natural or unnatural accumulation 
jury question 5 8 
natural  57, 58, 61, 88, 158 
Road 11, 58, 59, 158, 160, 162 
Salt  and sand 149 
STREET LIGHTING 
Generally 74, 149 
Poles 94, 107 
SURFACE OF ROAD OR SIDEWALK 
Bridges 
(See also BRIDGES, Holes/breaks in surface) 
Erosion 13, 73, 77 
Holes and sof t  spots 65, 108 
Obstacles on 
(See OBSTACLES ON ROAD OR SIDEWALK) 
Slippery 
snow and ice 
(See SNOW AND ICE) 
Water on 
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Maint. -
DEFECT: Hole in street. 





C o u r t  sa id :  It  is defendant 's  duty to do whatever is 
required to remedy defects in its streets and the fact that it 
had only two street commissioners who could not possibly 
look after every street would not rel ieve defendant of 
liabilities for injuries. 
Plaintiff claimed that the fact that similar defects were 
permitted to continue for a considerable amount of time 
without a t ten t ion  from defendant's authorities was 
evidence of def endantfs negligence. 
C o u r t  said: Whether similar defects were permitted to 
continue is of no consequence--the jury is only to be 




Plaintiff  offered evidence showing the hole had been in 
existence for ten days and defendant responded with evidence 
showing that persons living in the immediate vicinity had not 
seen it. 
Court said: Whether the immediate neighbors had ever seen 
the hole was of no consequence. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed. 
COMMENT: NIA 
Supreme Court 
Grand Rapids v. Wyman, 46 Mich. 516, 9 N.W. 833 (1881). 
DEFECT: Loose planks on bridge. 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff was riding his horse across defendant's bridge; the 





Defendant claimed that the duty to keep/maintain created 
liability only in t h e  public of f icers  having responsibility 
for roads and not in defendant the township itself. 
Court said: The statutory duty to keep/maintain is imposed 
upon the road authority itself. 
RESULT: Judgment for  defendant  was reversed  and t h e  c a s e  was  
remanded for trial. 
COMMENT: N o t e  t h a t  p r i o r  l a w  m a d e  only  pub l i c  r o a d  o f f i c e r s  
responsible for neglect of the roads. 
Supreme Court 
Burnham v. Byron Township, 46 Mich. 555, 9 N.W. 851 (1881). 
Maint -*) Permits 
DEFECT: Planks missing from wooden sidewalk--implications of 
repeated vandalism. 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff hurried along the sidewalk at night, stepped in the 





Court said: Despite any tampering with the walkway by 
third parties, it was defendant's duty to speedily make 
necessary repairs and improvements to keep the walkway 
reasonably safe and fit for travel, 
Defenses 
No notice and no time to repair 
Court said: Whether defendant had notice of the defect 
and an opportunity to repair it was a question of fact for 
the jury's decision. 
The jury could have found notice from the following facts: 
The walk was admit ted to be in genera l ly  bad 
condition. 
There was evidence of disrepair for several weeks 
prior to the accident. 
A plank was missing from the walk a day or two 
before the accident. 
The walk had holes in i t  several  t imes prior to 
plaintifPs fall. 
The street commissioner lived in plain sight of the 
walk. 
RESULT: Directed verdict for defendant was reversed and the case 
was remanded for a new trial, 
COMMENT: Note that damage caused by third parties does not relieve 
defendant of its liability for failing to repair the damage. 
The court used especially strong language to discuss the 
defect here-tltreacherous,tt ftbad,ff ltvicious.tt 
Supreme Court 
Dotton v. Albion Common Council, 50 Mich. 129, 15 N.W. 46 (1883). 
Maint. 
DEFECT: Ridge of ice on sidewalk caused by the trampling of snow, 
melting and freezing. 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff, a pedestrian, slipped and fell. 
INJURY: Broken arm, 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Negligence 
Plaintiff claimed defendant had a duty to remove snow 
and ice ridges. 
Court sa id :  The obligation to provide reasonably safe 
streets and sidewalks does not impose a duty to remove snow 
and ice ridges caused by pedestrian traffic. To do so would 
impose an unreasonable burden on the public authorities. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaint iff was reversed, and judgment was 
entered for defendant. 
COMMENT: This case appears to be the first to apply the statutory 
language-reasonably safe--to a snow and ice situation. 
The court observed that whether there was a duty to 
remove snow and ice could depend on whether it was the 
local custom to do so. 
Supreme Court 
McKellar v. City of Detroit, 57 Mich. 158, 23 N.W. 621 (1885). 
Eng., Maint Traffic -*' 
DEFECT: Wooden bridge with loose planks. 
ACCIDENT: Plaintif fTs horse stepped on the loose planks, became 
entangled in them, threw the wagon against the guardrail, 
which collapsed causing the horse, buggy, and plaintiff to fall 




Defendant claimed it was impossible for an ordinarily 
gentle horse to be frightened by a hole in the bridge that 
is said to have entangled plaintiff's horse. 
Court said: Whether the loose planking and holes associated 
with it were sufficient to fri hten an ordinarily gentle horse 
was clearly a question of fact f or the jury's decision. 
Notice 
Defendant objected to plaintiff's providing evidence of 
other horses being frightened by the loose planking prior 
to plaintiffTs accident. 
Court  s a i d :  This evidence was admissible to show 
def endant1s prior knowledge of the problem with the bridge. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $725 was affirmed. 
COMMENT: The court noted that after the injury to plaintiff an entirely 
new bridge was built at the site obliterating all evidence of 
the accident at the time it occurred. 
Supreme Court 
Smith v. Sherwood Township, 62 Mich. 159, 28 N.W. 806 (1886). -
Eng., Maint. -
DEFECT: Partly submerged road. 
ACCIDENT: Horse and buggy went off submerged embankment into deep 
water, 
INJURY: Property damage. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Defenses 
D e f e n d a n t  c l a i m e d  t h a t  p l a i n t i f f ' s  d r i v e r  was 
contributorily negligent in driving on a road that he could 
not see because it was submerged. 
Court said: Defendant is not excused merely because 
plaintiff voluntarily incurs a danger caused by defendant's 
negligence. If defendant's act induces plaintiff to incur the 
danger or causes plaintiff to incur some other danger to 
escape from peril, plaintiff's actions are not contributorily 
negligent. 
RESULT: Summary judgment for defendant was reversed and a new 
trial was ordered. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Supreme Court 
Harris v. Clinton Township, 64 Mich. 447, 31 N.W. 425 (1887), 
Eng., Permits, Traffic 
DEFECT: Dirt road thirty-five feet wide--no guardrail on embankment 
adjacent to river. 
ACCIDENT: Horse went down bank into river. 




Court said: Since there is some evidence in the case from 
which it could be inferred that defendant's neglect of the 
road in failing to erect a guardrail was the proximate cause 




Court said: Since there was some evidence from which the 
jury could infer that the plaintiff was not contributorily 
negligent, the question was one for the jury's decision. 
RESULT: Judgment for defendant was reversed and a new trial was 
ordered. 
COMMENT: The defendant in this case was a private company with a 
franchise to operate a road. The statute under which it  
operated required it to erect a guardrail along the edge of a 
road where the road was adjacent to the river. Defendant 
had failed to erect such a guardrail. 
Supreme Court 
ca rver  v. Detroit  and Saline Plank-Road Company, 69  Mich. 616, 
25 N.W. 183 (1885), affirmed 61 Mich. 584, 28 N.W. 721 (1886). 
Maint -9 Permits 
DEFECT: Pile of sand covering approximately half of the  s t r e e t  
adjacent to building in the process of construction. 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff drove her car r iage  down the  s t r e e t  a t  night,  
collided with the pile of sand, thus overturning the vehicle. 
INJURY: Said to be serious. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Negligence 
Defendant claimed its duty to keep/maintain did not 
require it to remove obstructions placed in the highways 
by third parties. 
Court said: Defendant's statutory duty to keep/maintain 
requires it to do all that is necessary to achieve that result 
including the placement of signals, other warnings, or other 
safeguards--otherwise defendant may close the s t r e e t  t o  
travel, Whether defendant is liable to plaintiff in this case 
is a question for the jury's decision. 




Joslyn v. City of Detroit, 74 Mich. 458, 42 N.W. 50 (1889). 
Enq;., Maint. -
DEFECT: Wooden bridge with rotten stringers. 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff drove his "traction engineff over the bridge, which 
gave way beneath him letting the engine fall into a creek. 
IN JURY: Property damage only. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Defenses 
No notice. Defendant claimed that only actual notice of 
the specific defect would suffice. 
Court said: The general duty of defendant is to exercise 
through its officers reasonable supervision of its roads and 
bridges and keep them reasonably safe for public travel. 
In discharging this duty defendant's officers may not ignore 
t h e  dictates of common sense or the lessons of ordinary 
experience, and refuse to see or refuse to heed what others 
see and understand. 
In this case there was evidence showing that the defective 
condition of the bridge in question had been reported to  
.defendant 's authorities previously. If in the exercise of 
reasonable care these authorities had inspected the bridge 
they could have found the defect in question. 
Whenever a person had knowledge sufficient to indicate the 
need for further investigation and he does not do so he will 
be charged with the responsibility for knowing those things 
that further investigation would have revealed. This type of 
notice is sufficient for a highway liability claim, and actual 
notice of the specific defect need not be proven. 
Whether defendant had notice of the defect was a question 
of fact for the jury's decision. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $500 was affirmed. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Supreme Court 
Moore v. Kenockee Township, 75 Mich. 332, 42 N.W. 944 (1889). 
Maint Permits -*' 
DEFECT: Hole in wooden crosswalk caused by broken plank. 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff stepped in hole in crosswalk and fell. 




Court said: Actual notice to defendant can be shown by 
knowledge presented to  any off ic ial  or off icer  having 
responsibility for the road. 
Individual knowledge of officers or agents with responsibility 
for street repair is the knowledge of their agency. 
Notice of general disrepair of crosswalks, as opposed to the 
particular defect in question, is not knowledge or notice of 
the defect. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff was reversed and new trial was 
ordered. 
COMMENT: Reasons for reversal  unrelated to principles of road 
liability-improperly admitted evidence. 
Some modern holdings temper this court's requirement of 
notice of the particular defect in question by permitting 
notice of like defects in the immediate vicinity, or notice 
of underlying s t ruc tu ra l  defec ts  giving rise to the  
particular defect. 
Supreme Court 
Dundas - - -- v. City of Lansing, 75 Mich. 499, 42 N.W. loll (1889). 
Eng., Maint Traffic -* 9 
DEFECT: Dirt on road with steep embankments and no guardrail--snow 
and ice on the road. 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff was a member of a group that drove over the road 
in a horse-drawn wagon at night. The rear wheels of the 
wagon slid over the edge of the embankment and plaintiff 
tried to push the rear of the wagon back onto the road--the 
wagon continued slipping, throwing plaintiff down the 




Plaintiff claimed that defendant had a duty to install 
railings or guardrails at the site to prevent vehicles from 
falling off the edge of the road. 
Court said: Defendant's duty is to keeplmaintain and 
whether the absence of railings at the site amounted to 
neglect of that duty was a question of fact for the jury's 
decision. 
If the roadway required guardrails to make it reasonably safe 
then it became defendant's duty to erect them. 
Defendant is not required to build a highway in a particular 
place, but having done so and invited the public to travel 
over it ,  it must follow its statutory duty or close the road 
to public travel. 
a Proximate cause 
Court  said: It appears that the lack of guardrails at the 
site was a direct cause of plaintiff's injury. 
Defenses 
Notice 
Cour t  said: While defendant had received no complaint 
about the road, it appears that defendant's officers including 
the overseer of highways lived close to the place and 
frequently traveled over it-therefore defendant must be held 
to have had notice of the defective condition. 
a Defendant claimed that the weather conditions required 
the use of sleighs only, rather than the wheeled vehicle 
involved. 
Court said: The evidence indicated that snow had melted 
and bare places appeared and that wheeled vehicles could be 
more easily drawn. 
Defendant claimed that the wagon involved was defective 
by being unwieldy and unm anageable, 
Court said: Whether this was so was a question of fact for 
the jury's decision. 
Defendant claimed tha t  plaintiff  was contributorily 
negligent in leaving the wagon and attempting to push it 
back onto the road. 
Court said: If it was the negligence of defendant in failing 
to repair the highway that created the difficulty with the 
wagon, then no negligence can be imputed to plaintiff who 
tried to look after the safety of the group as he did. 
Whet he r  p l a i n t i f f ' s  behav io r  was proper under the  
circumstances was a question of fact for the jury's decition. 
Defendant claimed that it should have been permitted to 
prove that similar embankments lacked railings by the 
c u s t o m a r y  s t a n d a r d s  used with r e s p e c t  to  such 
art>ankmen t s . 
Court said: Whether other road authorities maintain unsafe 
roads or fail to install railings where they are required has 
no bearing on defendant's duty to keeplmaintain. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $2,500 was affirmed. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Supreme Court 
Malloy v. Township of Walker, 77 Mich. 448, 43 N.W. 1012 (1889). 
Ex., Maint. -
DEFECT: Stump close to traveled portion of the road. 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff's wagon struck the stump at night-plaintiff thrown 
from it. 
INJURY: Unspecified injury to shoulder and arm-said to be serious. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Defenses 
Defendant claimed that the location of the stump was a 
defect in the construction of the road and is not covered 
by the liability statute. 
Court said: Construction and repair defects are covered by 
the liability statute. 
Negligence 
Duty 
Court said: Defendant must take account of the nighttime 
requirements of travelers on the road. 
How much of the roadway is required to be used for safe 
travel depends upon the travel necessities of any given case 
and defendant must take these necessities into account. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $500 was affirmed. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Supreme Court 
Sebert v. City of Alpena, 78 Mich. 165, 43 N.W. 1098 (1889). -
Maint Po' Traffic 
DEFECT: Gullies and ruts in the surface of the road--no guardrails--a 
log cast down an adjacent embankment by a previous traveler. 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff drove his horse and buggy over the road--horse 
shied at  the log and horse, buggy, and plaintiff fell down the 
adjacent embankment. 
INJURY: Broken arm. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Negligence 
Defendant claimed t h a t  the  proximate cause of the 
accident was the horse's being frightened by the log--in 
response plaintiff claimed that the proximate cause of the 
accident was the absence of guardrails by the embankment. 
Court said: Defendant is liable for the condition of the 
road only, not for the presence of objects beside the road 
that could frighten the horses. If the absence of guardrails 
makes the road unsafe for public travel, then defendant may 
be liable. Since the instructions of the court on this issue 
of proximate cause a r e  unclear the  judgment must be 
reversed. 




Beall -v. T o w n s h i p  of1 Mich. 536, 45 N.W. 1014 (1890). 
Maint Permits * '  
DEFECT: Hole in crosswalk. 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff stepped over the hole onto a loose plank, which 





Court said: Knowledge of defendant's alderman and street 
commissioner who knew of holes in the walkway prior to 
plaintiff's fall could be considered by the jury as evidence 
from which it could find notice. 
Knowledge of the holes, however, is not knowledge of the 
weakened plank--knowledge of one defect (broken plank) 
cannot be inferred from neglect to repair another (hole). 
a Crosswalk had originally been built by a private person. 
Court said: Once the crosswalk was in place, it became 
included in the defendant's duty to keeplm aintain--def endant 
cannot avoid liability by permitting an adjacent property 
owner to put down a sidewalk. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff was reversed and a new trial was 
ordered. 
COMMENT: Modern cases tend to be less rigorous in denying that notice 
of one defect may be inferred from the presence of others. 
Supreme Court 
Fuller v. Mayor of Jackson, 82 Mich. 480, 46 N.W. 721 (1890). 
Maint Permits .' 
DEFECT: Hole in wooden sidewalk. 




a Defendant claimed that its lack of funds and supporting 
staff as well as i t s  relat ively brief exis tence as a 
corporate entity should excuse its failure to repair and 
improve the sidewalk system. 
Court  sa id :  Defendant's duty to keep/maintain is an 
imperative one and its neglect to raise adequate funding or 
provide proper staffing will not excuse it from liability. 
a Defendant claimed that since many of the sidewalks were 
installed and built by private citizens it should not be 
liable for defects in such sidewalks. 
Court  sa id :  Defendant has adequate legal authority to 
compel and charge for proper maintenance and construction 
of sidewalks and cannot escape liability because it did not 
build the walk or direct its construction. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed. 
COMMENT: a The court permit ted plaintiff to  use e v i d e n c e  of 
subsequent repair to show the location of the alleged 
defect and to use evidence of injury to other people on 
account of the  defec t  to  show the nature and prior 
existence of the defect. 
a The court noted tha t  evidence of the existence and 
nature of the defect might also tend to show constructive 
notice of the defect to the defendant and that accidents 
resulting in serious injury might take on suff icient  
publicity to show actual notice to the defendant. 
Supreme Court 
Lombar v. Village of East Tawas, 86 Mich. 14, 48 N.W. 947 (1891). 
Maint. -
DEFECT: Log partially buried in the center of a dirt road. 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff drove his wagon up the road, struck the end of the 
log, and was thrown from wagon. 
INJURY: Broken leg-said to be permanent disability. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Negligence 
o Defendant tried to ask a witness whether he had heard of 
or known about other people injured a t  the site prior to 
plaintif f's accident. 
Court said: This evidence was not admissible. 
Several witnesses were asked for their opinion whether 
the road was dangerous at the site of the accident. 
Court said: Witnesses may testify as to the conditions they 
observed but their opinions are not admissible as it is for 
the jury to determine whether the road was reasonably safe. 
Defendant asked a witness about plaintiff's driving habits. 
Court said: Plaintiff's behavior at the time of the accident 
is what matters, not his general behavior. 
Defendant asked a witness about plaintiff's drinking habits. 
Court said: While plaintiff's sobriety a t  the time of the 
accident might be important, one cannot assume that one 
who drinks often is always drunk or always in a condition 
that excludes possibility of using due care. 
o Plaintiff had a former overseer of highways testify that 
he cut off the raised end of the log some time after the 
plaintiff's accident. 
C o u r t  said: In the absence of instructions by the trial 
court guarding the jury against the use of such testimony as 
an admission of defendant's negligence, it was not proper to 
admit this evidence. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff was reversed and a new trial ordered. 
COMMENT: The case is largely concerned with evidentiary points. - 
Supreme Court 
Langworthx v. Township of Green, 88 Mich. 207, 50 N.W. 130 (1891). 
Permits 
DEFECT: Large excavation adjacent to alley. 




Defendant claimed that the road in question was not a 
Tfpublic highwayTT and hence that its duty to keeplm aint ain 
did not include defects by the alley. 
Court said: The alley in question is a public alley such 
that adjacent property owners may not interfere with its use, 
but it is not a highway within the meaning of the statute. 
RESULT: Directed verdict for defendant was affirmed. 
COMMENT: Note that the modern statute expressly excludes alleys. 
Supreme Court 
Face -v. City of Ionia, 90 Mich. 104, 51 N.W. 184 (1892). 
Maint. -
DEFECT: Bridge over creek under dirt road--water would undermine 
the edge of the road causing holes to appear at some places 
and leaving other places with only a thin layer of soil on the 
surface. 
ACCIDENT: Plaint iff rode his horse over the road-horse either stepped 
in one of the existing holes and threw the rider or broke 
through the surface and threw the rider-location of accident 
in relation to bridge in dispute. 
IN JURY: Unspecified-said to be severe. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Negligence 
a The trial court instructed the jury that if the horse broke 
through a new hole, the jury could infer from the existing 
holes that a defect existed and that defendant could be 
liable for failure to repair it. 
Court said: Defendant does not have a duty to test the 
entire length of its roadways, and if t he re  was nothing 
appearing at the portion of the road where plaintiff's horse 
fell to indicate that it was undermined, then defendant could 
not be liable. 
Since it was clear that defendant knew of the existing holes 
and had placed a warning pole in one of them, if the horse 
fell at this point, defendant would be liable. 
Since the erroneous instruction prejudiced defendant's case, 
the judgment must be reversed. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff was reversed and a new trial was 
ordered. 
COMMENT: A modern appeals court would be more likely to leave to the 
jury the determination of defendant's liability for a latent 
defect-if the other elements of negligence were proven, 
defendant probably would be liable for failure to repair such 
defect. 
Supreme Court 
Wakeham v. Township of St. Clair, 91 Mich. 15, 51 N.W. 696 (1892). 
All - 
DEFECT: Unspecified: "The highway was in very bad condition." 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff was thrown from horsedrawn cart. 
INJURY: Unspecified. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Def ens- 
Defendant claimed plaintiff was contributorily negligent 
because he knew the road was in very bad condition and 
drove over it at an improper speed. 
Court said: The testimony as to the condition of the road 
and plaintiff's speed was not conclusive, so the question of 
contributory negligence was  for the jury to decide, 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed. 
COMMENT: The judge permitted evidence of previous accidents to show 
notice of the defect. 
Supreme Court 
Corcoran v. City of Detroit, 95 Mich. 84, 54 N.W. 692 (1893). 
Maint. -
DEFECT: Ice on sidewalk, formed by water backup in ca tch  basin. 





Court said: T h e  c a t c h  basin was not defective. The flow 
of  w a t e r  f r o m  a r o a d  i s  n a t u r a l ,  a n d  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  
accumulation of ice on a sidewalk was a natural  accumulation. 
RESULT: Directed verdict for defendant was affirmed. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Supreme Court  
Kannenberg v. City of Alpena, 96 Mich. 53, 55 N.W. 614 (1893). 
All - 
DEFECT: Excavation in street for purpose of laying water pipes. 
ACCIDENT: Plaint iff riding in a horse-drawn buggy approached the 





Plaintiff claimed defendant had a duty to erect railings 
or barriers around the excavation. 
Court said: Defendant does not have such a duty except at 
night when, by the placing of barriers and lights, it can give 
warning of dangerous hazards. 
Neither duty nor custom require that the street be closed or 
that barriers be erected along the excavation; therefore, 
there is no liability. 
RESULT: Directed verdict for defendant was affirmed. 
COMMENT: The court noted that several witnesses gave testimony 
that plaintiff's horse appeared to be out of control and 
going rather fast as it approached the excavations. 
Note that a modern court would be more likely to permit 
a jury to determine whether the absence of guardrails 
breached the duty to keep/maintain. 
The statement that barricades are required only at night 
is of doubtful validity in light of the conditions existing 
today. 
Supreme Court 
OtRourke v. City of Monroe, 98 Mich. 520, 57 NOW, 738 (1894). 
Maint. -
DEFECT: Manhole cover in street--suport for manhole worn away a t  
edge. 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff stepped on the manhole cover, which tipped up, 




Defendant claimed that its duty to keeplmaintain its 
streets in a condition suitable for pedestrians involved 
only crosswalks and not nearby manhole covers. 
Court said: While defendant is not required to construct a 
smooth surface for travel over all of its street and may give 
special attention to established crosswalks, it is not unusual 
for pedestrians to cross at  points other than crosswalks and 
to pass over manhole covers. Therefore,  whether the 
manhole in question made the street unsafe was a question 
of fact for the jury's decision. 
Defenses 
Contributory negligence 
Court said: Since a road authority need not keep the space 
covered by a manhole in as smooth a condition as a 
sidewalk, it was misleading for the trial judge to instruct the 
jury that defendant had such a duty. Pedestrians using the 
s t r e e t  a t  such a point must take proper account of the 
unevenness of the surface and since the evidence in this case 
indicated that plaintiff was under the influence of liquor and 
paid no attention to where he was going the question of 
plaintiff's contributory negligence should have been left for 
the jury's decision. 




Lincoln v. City of Detroit, 101 Mich. 245, 59 N.W. 617 (1894). 
Maint. -
DEFECT: A ridge of ice formed on a sidewalk by the  tramping, 
freezing, and melting of snow, 
ACCIDENT: Unspecified, 
IN JURY: Unspecified. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Negligence 
Plaintiff claimed that  defendant was negligent in 
permitting the accumulation of snow and ice on the 
sidewalk. 
Court said: The city is not liable for an accumulation of 
snow and ice that is made uneven by pedestrian traffic. 
RESULT: Judgment for defendant was affirmed. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Supreme Court 
Rolf - v. City of Greenville, 102 Mich. 544, 61 N.W. 3 (1894). 
DEFECT: Accumulation on street of snow and i ce  shoveled from 
streetcar tracks and adjacent sidewalks, 




a Plaintiff claimed the city was liable for the accumulation 
of snow and ice. 
C o u r t  s a i d :  The  c i t y  is  not  l i a b l e  f o r  n a t u r a l  
accumulations. It is liable when an accumulation is put in 
the street by the city or by its express authority. The need 
to clear paths through the snow requires that it be piled 
along the sides of streets. It would be unjust to hold the 
city liable when the weather changes such accumulations to 
ice. 
RESULT: Judgment for defendant was affirmed. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Supreme Court 
Hutchinson v. City of Ypsilanti, 103 Mich. 12, 61 N.W.2d 279 (1894). 
Eng., Traffic 
DEFECT: Absence of guardrails on a road running across a dam with a 
spillway by the road. 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff drove her buggy over the road and the horse 
became frightened at the sound of the rushing water. The 
horse led the buggy down a nearby embankment and plaintiff 
was forced to jump from the buggy. 
INJURY: Unspecified-said to be serious. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Negligence 
Defendant claimed that  the proximate cause of the 
accident was plaintiff's horse, not the absence of 
guardrai 1s. 
Court said: Whether guardrails were required at  this 
location in order to make the road reasonably safe was a 
question of fact for the jury's decision. 




Ross -v. Ionia Township, 104 Mich. 320, 62 N.W. 401 (1895). 
DEFECT: Gut ter  7 to  12 inches wide, and 5 to 7 inches d e e p  
separating wooden sidewalk from curb--wooden cover for 
gutter absent. 




Defendant claimed that the provision of wooden covers 
for curb areas adjacent to crosswalks was part of the 
integral plan of the drainage system for the city, and 
that the city was not liable for defects in such a plan, 
Court said: Breaches of the duty to keep/maintain under 
the municipal liability s t a t u t e  can ar ise  from flagrant  
construction defects as well as a neglect to repair. In this 
case the evidence showed that the gutters were often left  
uncovered when the "planft contemplated that they should be 
covered. Therefore, it cannot be said as a matter of law 
that the sidewalk was safe for travel and whether defendant 
breached its duty was a question of fact for jury's decision. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed. 
COMMENT: Note that modern law makes road authori ty l iable for 
defec ts  in an original plan as well as for negligence in 
construction and repair, and does not require that defects be 
"flagrant .ll 
Supreme Court 
Schrader v. City of Port Huron, 106 Mich. 173, 63 N.W. 964 (1895). 
Maint. -
DEFECT: Accumulation of ice on a sidewalk. 




D e f e n d a n t  c l a i m e d  t h a t  p l a i n t i f f  was contr ibutori ly 
n e g l i g e n t  i n  walking on a s i d e w a l k  s h e  k n e w  w a s  
dangerous. 
Court said: It was daytime and plaintiff saw the ice before 
stepping on i t ,  and could have avoided it. Therefore,  s h e  
was contributorily negligent a t  a matter of law. 
RESULT: Judgment for defendant was affirmed. 
COMMENT: A modern  cour t  would be more likely t o  allow a jury t o  
decide whether the plaintiff was contributorily negligent. 
Supreme Court 
Black -v. City of Manistee, 107 Mich. 60, 64 N.W. 868 (1895). 
Maint. -







Court said: Accumula t ions  of i c e  on sidewalks caused by 
t h e  natural f low of w a t e r  f rom a d j a c e n t  l ands  a r e  n a t u r a l  
accumulations and the  ci ty is not liable for them. 
RESULT: Directed verdict for defendant was affirmed. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Supreme Court  
Gavet t  v. City of Jackson, 109 Mich. 408, 67 N.W. 517 (1896). 
Maint. -
DEFECT: Wooden sidewalk with loose planks and rotten stringers. 
ACCIDENT: P l a i n t i f f  walked over  t h e  s idewalk,  t r ipped  on t h e  loose  




Defendant  c la imed t h a t  since it had recently repaved the 
sidewalk prior t o  plaintiff 's  injury, no t  enough t i m e  had 
passed af ter  the repair to  make defendant negligent. 
Court sa id :  If t h i s  is t rue ,  d e f e n d a n t  h a s  a c o m p l e t e  
defense.  Since plaintiff  had contrary evidence on the point, 
the question was one for the  jury's decision. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed. 
COMMENT: The cour t  pe rmi t t ed  plaint i f f  t o  use ev idence  of previous 
accidents t o  prove notice. 
Supreme Court 
Storrs v. City of Grand Rapids, ll0 Mich. 483, 68 N.W. 258 (1896). 
Maint. -
DEFECT: Loose board in wooden sidewalk. 
ACCIDENT: Board flew up and tripped plaintiff who fell. 
INJURY: Broken kneecap--great injury to  spine and head. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Defenses 
D e f e n d a n t  c la imed  t h a t  p la in t i f f  neglected her condition 
and thus was contributorily negligent. 
Court said: Testimony a t  tr ial  that  plaintiff was anxious to  
return t o  work rather than s e e k  medica l  t r e a t m e n t  b e c a u s e  
s h e  h a d  f u n e r a l  e x p e n s e s  f o r  h e r  m o t h e r  a n d  o t h e r  
obligations to  meet was pre judic ia l  t o  de fendan t .  Evidence 
s h o w i n g  t h e  p o v e r t y  o f  a p l a i n t i f f  t e n d s  t o  a r o u s e  t h e  
sympathy of the  jury, and is not relevant. 
RESULT: J u d g m e n t  for  p la in t i f f  in  the  amount of $1,600 was reversed 
and a new trial was ordered. 
COMMENT: C a s e  t u r n s  largely on evidentiary rules, rather than principles 
of road liability. 
Supreme Court 
Burleson v. Village of Reading, ll0 Mich. 512, 68 N.W. 294 (1896). 
Eng. 
DEFECT: Sidewalk over wooden bridge-question of defect ive  material. 




ISSUES: D e f e n s e s  
a No notice 
Court said: T h e r e  was s u f f i c i e n t  e v i d e n c e  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  
condition of t h e  bridge t o  permit  t h e  jury t o  d e c i d e  w h e t h e r  
d e f e n d a n t  had notice of the  decayed condition of t h e  t imbers 
supporting t h e  bridge and whether t h e  d e f e n d a n t  shou ld  h a v e  
made further inquiries concerning t h e  condition of t h e  bridge. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Supreme Court  
Snyder v. Ci ty  of Albion, 113 Mich. 275, 71 N.W. 475 (1897). 
Eng., Maint. -
DEFECT: Washout on a dirt road-wagon forced to go to the edge of 
the road, which was undermined, to avoid the washout. 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff  drove his wagon around the  washout, which 





The t r i a l  court  instructed the jury that the liability 
statute is to be construed "reasonably," taking into 
consideration that defendant performs its duties by means 
of public officers. 
Court said: That defendant performs its duties through 
public officers is irrelevant-the statute creates the duty to 
keep the roads reasonably safe and it does not matter that 
the defendant acted 
The trial court had instructed the jury that it was to 
determine whether, in the exercise of reasonable care, 
defendant should have known about the defect. 
Court said: Plaintiff need not prove that the township 
failed to undertake an investigation that would have informed 
it of the existence of the defect. Plaintiff only need show 
that the defect existed before the required statutory time. 
RESULT: Judgment for defendant was reversed. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Supreme Court 
Handy v. Meridian Township, 114 Mich. 454, 7 2  N.W. 251 (1897). 
Maint. -




ISS U ES : Negligence 
Duty 
Court  said: All s idewalks have  inclines.  A c i t y  i s  not  
liable if they a re  made unsafe by t h e  na tu ra l  accumula t ion  
of ice and snow. 
RESULT: Judgment for defendant was affirmed. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Supreme Court 
Wesley v. City of Detroit, l l7  Mich. 658, 76 N.W. 104 (1898). 
Maint., - Eng. 
DEFECT: Plank missing from bridge floor. 
ACCIDENT: Plank missing from floor of bridge--plaintiff stepped into 




Plaint i f f  claimed defendant had a duty to inspect i ts  
bridges and for failure to undertake inspection alone 
defendant should be liable. 
C o u r t  said:  There is no duty to inspect  apart from 




Court said: When a person knows certain facts that would 
lead a reasonable person to make additional investigation and 
he fails to do so, he will be charged with the responsibility 
for knowing those things that his additional investigation 
would have revealed. This is constructive notice. In this 
case there is no evidence tha t  t h e  defendant  had any 
knowledge that should have made it suspicious enough to 
undertake further investigation. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff was reversed and a new trial was 
ordered. 
COMMENT: Case contains  extensive discussion of early precedents 
establishing the principle of constructive notice in a road 
liability setting. Although modern statutes and other aspects 
of law are different from those contained in the case, the 
principles of constructive notice stated here continue to be 
the law. 
Supreme Court 
Thomas v. City of Flint, 123 Mich. 10, 81 N.W. 936 (1900). 
Eng., Traffic 
DEFECT: Drawbridge opened to permit a boat to pass. A chain was 
normally stretched across the opening, but on the night of 
the accident, it was broken. 





Defendan t  c la imed  t h a t  p la in t i f f  was contributorily 
negligent in that he was aware of the dangerous condition 
of the bridge and rode carelessly into the opening. 
Court said: Evidence that plaintiff had, on prior occasions, 
r idden against a chain guarding this and similar bridges, 
could be admitted to show that  plaintiff knew the kind of 
ba r r i e r  t h a t  was in p lace .  The t r i a l  cou r t  careful ly  
instructed the jury that it could not consider the evidence as 
proof of plaintiff's carelessness on the night of the accident. 
In the absence of evidence that  the jury disregarded t h e  
instructions of the court, the case will not be reversed. 
RESULT: Judgment for defendant was affirmed. 
COMMENT: The case is largely concerned with questions of evidence and 
proper jury instructions, 
Supreme Court 
Benedict v. City of Port Huron, 124 Mich. 600, 83 N.W. 614 (1900). 
Maint. -
DEFECT: Accumulation of ice on a sidewalk in a depression t h a t  
a r re s t ed  the  normal flow of water. Water from normal 
runoff and from a leaking tank had accumulated and frozen. 




P l a i n t i f f  c la imed the  defendant  was negligent in 
permitting the water to accumulate. 
Court said: The defendant city was liable if the depression 
caused the formation of ice in unusual quantities, and if the 
city had permitted the leaking from the tank to continue for 
a long time. Whether this occurred was a question of fact 
for the jury. 
RESULT: Directed verdict for defendant was reversed. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Supreme Court 
Navarre v. City of Benton Harbor, 126 Mich. 618, 86 N.W. 138 (1901). 
Eng., Maint. -
DEFECT: Culvert running under paved road-six inch drop from the top 
of the culvert to the roadbed. 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff, a child of eleven years, drove a team of horses 
over the road and apparently was shaken from the wagon 




D e f e n d a n t  c l a i m e d  t h a t  p l a i n t i f f ' s  f a t h e r  was 
contributorily negligent in that he noticed the drop earlier 
in the day and failed to warn the boy about it. 
Court said: Plaintifffs obligation is to use ordinary care 
when going over the road and on proof of showing such 
ordinary care, father's forgetfulness is not contributory 
negligence. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $800 was affirmed. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Supreme Court 
Miller -v. Meade Township, 128 Mich. 98, 87 N.W. 131 (1901). 
All -
DEFECT: Corduroy road in generally poor condition. 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff drove his team over the road; a horse broke through 
a rotten piece of the road and was injured. 
INJURY: Property damage only. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Defenses 
Defendant claimed tha t  plaintiff  was contributorily 
negligent for driving over the road when he knew that it 
was  in poor condition. 
Court said: While it is true that plaintiff was aware that 
the road was in poor condition, he also knew that i t  was in 
constant use by other people. The test is whether no person 
in the exercise of ordinary prudence would attempt to pass 
over the highway and if not, it is not negligence as a matter 
of law for plaintiff to attempt to pass over a highway known 
to be defective. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $300 was affirmed. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Supreme Court 
McTiver v. Township of Grant, 131 Mich. 456, 91 N.W. 736 (1902). 
Maint. -
DEFECT: IVashout on a dirt road crossing a ravine. 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff drove her horse and buggy across the road. when 
the horse approached the washout it shied toward the edge 
of the road, which collapsed tumbling plaintiff, buggy, and 
horse down the adjacent embankment. 




Court said: The washout in queston had existed each spring 
and fall for at  least two years and defendant's of f icers  
therefore must have known of it before plaintiff's injury. 
Therefore, the question of defendant 's  negligence was 
properly submitted for the jury's decision. 
e Defendant claimed t h a t .  plaintiff  was contr ibutori ly  
negligent as a matter of law. 
Court said: Plaintiff's testimony that she was admiring the 
scenery in the ravine, failed to see the washout until the 
horse shied, and knew that the horse often shied at various 
items including washouts indicates that she was not using due 
care under the circumstances of a narrow road with a 
readily observable washout. Plaintiff is required to show 
some care under the circumstances for her own safety, and 
no care is shown in this case. Therefore, the plaintiff is 
contributorily negligent as a matter of law. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff was reversed and a new trial was 
ordered. 
COMMENT: Note that a modern appeals court would be less likely to 
reverse a jury's finding regarding plaintiff's contributory 
negligence. 
Supreme Court 
Tracey v. South Haven Township, 132 Mich. 492, 93 N.W. 1065 (1903). 
Maint -* 9 Permits 
DEFECT: Ice on sidewalk due to water flowing from an adjacent  
property. 





Court said: The fact that the ice had been on the sidewalk 
for four days does not justify a finding that the defendant 
had notice without proof that the accumulation of ice was 
f7notorious.f7 
The jury could not infer notice from the fact that the 
president of the city council lived opposite the  s i t e  in 
question, that two patrolmen frequently met on the street in 
question, and that the city clerk passed over the site the 
day before the accident-knowledge of highway officers would 
amount to notice, but none of these persons is such an 
officer with the possible exception of the president of the 
council, and as to him there is no evidence that he knew of 
the ice. 
RESULT: Directed verdict for the defendant was affirmed. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Supreme Court 
Corey v. City of Ann Arbor, 134 Mich. 376, 96 N.W. 477 (1903). 
Maint -07 Permits 
DEFECT: Stones placed in street during construction of a building. 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff's wagon went down the street,  struck the stones, 




Defendant claimed it had no duty to remove obstructions 
from its streets. 
Court said: Def endant1s duty to keep/maintain includes the 
removal of obstructions. 
Defendant would be liable for obstructions that it permits to 
be placed in the street (such as permitting a house to be 
moved down the street) as well as for obstructions that it 
did not license. 
Defenses 
e Notice 
Court said: Defendant's liability for failure to remove 
obstructions depends upon its knowledge of the obstruction 
and a reasonable time within which to remove it, since the 
superintendent of defendant's streets had observed the stones 
in  question and directed contractors to remove stones from a 
nearby sidewalk, and since the mayor lived on an adjacent 
lot and passed the stones daily there was actual notice sf 
this obstruction in this case. 
RESULT: Directed verdict for defendant was reversed and a new trial 
was ordered. 
COMMENT: Case contains considerable discussion of early precedents and 
statutes discussing the duty to keep/maintain,  and is a 
thorough presentation of the basic principles of road liability. 
Supreme Court 
McEvoy v. City of Sault Ste. Marie, 136 Mich. 172, 98 N.W. 1006 (1904). 
Maint. -
DEFECT: Hole in surface of dirt road. 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff was thrown from the seat of a wagon when the 





Court said: It is plaintiff's obligation to prove notice to 
defendant of the alleged defect--here the only evidence of 
not ice  was defendant 's  fa i lure  to  call the overseer of 
highways to the witness stand--plaintiff's attorney argued 
t h a t  t he  overseer was not called because he would have 
testified that he knew of the dangerous condition of road. 
The comments of plaintiff's attorney in this connection were 
improper and the jury would not have been entitled to infer 
notice from the failure to call the overseer as a witness. 
The length of time the hole existed and the extent of i ts  
notoriety were questions of fact for the jury's decision. 
Contributory negligence 
Court said: Whet her plaintiff was contributorily negligent 
was a question of fact for the jury's decision. 




Cavanaugh v. Riverside Township, 136 Mich. 660, 99 N.W. 876 (1904). 
Eng,, Maint. -
DEFECT: Abandoned trolley car line-tracks in place, but covered with 
cinders-vehicle wheels would sink into adjacent ground in 
wet weather. 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff drove a wagon to this spot and while crossing the 




Defendant claimed no negligence. 
Court said: Since it appears that the abandoned track was 
dangerous in wet weather, the rails should have been taken 
up when the use of the track ceased--if the track had been 
in use, its connection with a main track could easily have 
been seen and persons would have taken care to approach it  
a t  r ight angles. The fai lure to  take up the tracks is 
negligence as a matter of law. 
Defenses 
a Notice 
Court said: Since this condition had existed for two and 
one-half years defendant is presumed as a matter of law to 
have noticed it. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed, 
COMMENT: N/A 
Supreme Court 
Cutcher v. City of Detroit, 139 Mich. 186, 102 N.W. 629 (1905). 
Eng., Maint. -
DEFECT: Loose plank in wooden sidewalk--defective and decayed 
stringers. 






Court said: The condition of the sidewalk was called to 
the attention of the  village s t r e e t  commissioner by a 
member of the common council shortly before this accident 
and the street commissioner and repairman subsequently 
walked over the entire block but failed to find the defect. 
While defendant does not have a duty to  inspect  in a l l  
circumstances,  when put on actual notice of a potential 
defect, there is a duty to inspect, and to carry out that 
inspection with due care. 
It  is not a sufficient discharge of this duty to make a casual 
inspection. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff affirmed. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Supreme Court 
Hunter v. Village of Ithaca, 141 Mich. 539, 105 N.W. 9 (1905). 
Eng. 
DEFECT: Street excavation--trolley car rails in the center  of t h e  
street--boards laid over the rails as a temporary crosswalk to 
assist pedestrians. 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff walked over the boards, one of which flew up and 
tripped her. 
INJURY: Unspecified injury to knee--said to be severe and permanent. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Defenses 
e No notice 
Court said: The construction, while done by defendant's 
contractor, was entirely under the supervision and control of 
defendant, and the evidence indicated that the crosswalk in 
question had been in place for about ten days. 
Defendant claimed plaintiff was contributorily negligent in 
that she testified she was not looking at the board ahead 
of her, which flew up and tripped her, 
Court said: Plaintiff was not walking on the loose board a t  
the time it tripped her, and whether her failure to observe 
it amounted to contributory negligence was a question of 
fact for the jury's decision, 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $1,500 was affirmed. 
COMMENT: The court permitted witnesses to give their observations, 
made one or two days after the accident in question, of the 
crosswalk with its loose boards and found such testimony not 
?'too r e r n ~ t e . ~ ~  
Supreme Court 
Barker v. City of Kalamazoo, 146 Mich. 257, 109 N.W. 427 (1906). 
Maint -*' Permits 
DEFECT: Repairs being made to building fronting on sidewalk--debris 
p i l e d  n e a r b y - - g r a t i n g s  r emoved  f rom open ing  in 
sidewalk--opening covered intermittently with boards. 
ACCIDENT: At night plaintiff walked over the sidewalk, and stepped in 
one of the openings. 
INJURY: Said to be serious injury to leg. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Negligence 
Defendant claimed that since the defect in question was 
the responsibility of the adjacent property owner i t  was 
not included within def endantts duty to keeplmaintain. 
Court said: Defendant is not relieved of i t s  duty t o  
keeplmaintain if its streets are made unsafe by the acts of 
third persons. 
Defenses 
Defendant claimed that the statutory notification was 
defective for lack of specification of details concerning 
the injury and medical expenses associated with it. 
Court said: The notification provided to the defendant was 
sufficiently precise. 
Notice 
Court said: Evidence showing that the grating had been 
removed for two to five weeks, that light boards covering 
the  grat ing were frequently removed, that the mayor, 
policeman, and alderman all had knowledge of the situation, 
and that the street commissioner worked in a nearby alley 
for nearly three weeks was sufficient to permit the jury to 
decide whether defendant had notice. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed. 
COMMENT: T h e  c o u r t  n o t e d  t h a t  a r g u m e n t s  by p la in t i f f ' s  a t t o r n e y s  
tending t o  c o n t r a s t  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  s i t u a t i o n  of t h e  p la in t i f f  
a n d  t h e  d e f e n d a n t  w e r e  i m p r o p e r  bu t  n o t  s o  influential t o  
t h e  jury tha t  t h e  case  should be reversed. 
Supreme Court  
Davis -v. City  of Adrian, 147 Mich. 300, U0 N.W. 1084 (1907). 
Eng,, Maint Traffic * '  
DEFECT: Road over culvert-said to be too narrow and poorly drained, 
thus causing washouts by the edge of the road-no barriers 
or railings present. 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff rode his bicycle over the culvert and at the edge of 




Defendant claimed that the cause of the accident was 
plaintiff's losing control of his bicycle and not the  
narrowness of the road, the rutting at  the edge, or the 
absence of any barriers. 
Court said: It is clear from plaintiff's own evidence that 
the only cause of the accident was plaintiff's losing control 
of the bicycle and not any defect in the road. 
RESULT: Directed verdict for defendant was affirmed. 
COMMENT: A modern appeals court would be more likely to view the 
issue of whether a road defect was the cause of plaintiff's 
injury as a question of fact for the jury's decision. 
Supreme Court 
Briggs v. Pine River Township, 150 Mich. 381, 114 N.W. 221 (1907). 
Maint.. Permits. Traffic 
DEFECT: Planking over a culvert under the highway was removed. No 
warning l ights  or barriers were placed--bags of cement 
placed close by the road by the highway department. 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff drove his horse past the bags. The bags apparently 
frightened the horse, which broke into a run and the buggy 




IS U ES: Defenses 
Defendant claimed that the plaintiff was contributorily 
negligent as a matter of law. 
Court said: Since defendant was responsible for the placing 
of the cement and for the planks missing from the culvert, 
whether plaintiff 's  handling of the  horse amounted to 
contributory negligence was a question of fact for the jury's 
decision. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed. 
COMMENT: NIA 
Supreme Court 
Judd v. Caledonia Township, 150 Mich. 480, 114 N.W. 346 (1907). -
DEFECT: Ridge of ice on street at crossing with sidewalk. 




Plaintiff claimed that the city was negligent in digging a 
drainage trench through snow and ice, and throwing the 
removed snow and ice across the walk. 
Court said: The city is liable if its employee did put snow 
and ice in the walk. Whether he did so was a question of 
fact for the jury's decision. 
RESULT: Directed verdict for defendant city was reversed and the 
case was remanded for a new trial. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Supreme Court 
Bowen -v. City of Detroit, 150 Mich. 546, 114 N.W. 344 (1907). 
Eng., Maint. -
DEFECT: Accumulation of ice in excavation for sidewalk. 




P l a i n t i f f  c laimed the defendant  was negligent in 
permitting the accumulation of ice in the uncompleted 
sidewalk. 
Court said: An uncompleted sidewalk is not necessarily 
defective. The sidewalk was less likely to accumulate water 
in this condition than if it had been completed. 
RESULT: Judgment for defendant was affirmed. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Supreme Court 
Pringle v. City of Detroit, 152 Mich. 445, 116 N.W. 362 (1908). 
Maint. -
DEFECT: Accumulation of ice and snow shoveled from railroad tracks 
onto s t r e e t  caused a driver of a team of horses to lose 
control of them when thrown from the sleigh. 




r Plaintiff claimed the accident was caused by defendant's 
failure to remove the accumulation. 
Court said: The city is not liable for natural accumulations 
of ice and snow, but whether an accumulation caused b y  
shoveling snow from the railroad tracks was unnatural was at 
least a question for the jury's decision. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed. 
COMMENT: The case does not state whether the snow was shovelled by 
city employees. 
Supreme Court 
Johnson v. City of Marquette, 154 Mich. 50, 117 N.W. 658 (1908). 
DEFECT: Street excavated for new pavement--planks laid to assist 
pedestrians crossing, 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff crossed planks over street excavation, slipped, and 
fell, 
INJURY: Unspecified injury to foot. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Defenses 
D e f e n d a n t  c la imed any negligence present  is the  
responsibility of the defendant's con t r ac to r ,  not the  
defendant. 
Court said: Defendant retained supervisory control of the 
work and cannot by relieved from liability by turning the 
street over to a contractor. 
No notice. 
Court said: Testimony at trial showed that the planks in 
question had been in place for some time and had been 
placed and handled by the  road crews making notice a 
question of fact for the jury's decision. 
Defendant claimed plaintiff was contributorily negligent as 
a matter of law. 
Court sa id :  Plaint i ff ' s  contributory negligence was a 
question of fact for the jury's decision. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff  was reversed and the case was 
remanded for a new trial. 
COMMENT: Reasons for reversal  unrelated to principles of road 
liability--inflam matory and prejudicial  s t a t ement s  b y  
plaintiff's attorney. 
Supreme Court 
Hughes v. City of Detroit, 161 Mich. 283, 126 N.W. 214 (1910). 
Maint, -
DEFECT: Unguarded ditch. 




Plaint i f f  claimed the defendant was negligent in failing to  
erect a barrier to the ditch. 
Court  s a i d :  W h e t h e r  t h e  d u t y  t o  m a k e  t h e  highway 
reasonably s a f e  required t h a t  a ba r r i e r  be  e r e c t e d  was a 
question of fact  for the jury. 
Defenses  
D e f e n d a n t  c la imed t h a t  the plaint i f f  was negl igent  in 
continuing to walk when she had lost her  bearings due  t o  
a blinding flash of lightning. 
Court sa id :  If plaintiff had become confused and continued 
blindly on she was negligent. Whether s h e  had done so was 
a question of fact  for the jury. 
RESULT: Judgment  fo r  p la in t i f f  was  r e v e r s e d  a n d  t h e  c a s e  was 
remanded for a new trial. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Supreme Court 
Hunt -v. Douglass Township, 165 Mich. 187, 130 N.W. 648 (19ll). 
Maint -., Traffic 
DEFECT: Absence of guardrail along a road under repair. 
ACCIDENT: Horse-drawn cart slipped off road. 
INJURY: Serious injury to back-permanent disability. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Negligence 
Plaint iff  claimed defendant was negligent in failing to 
erect guardrails. 
Court said: As long as a road is open to  travel, the duty 
to make i t  reasonably s a f e  still applies, even though i t  is 
under  r e p a i r .  Whe the r  guardra i l s  were required was a 
question of fact for the jury. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $375 was affirmed. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Supreme Court 
Speck v. Bruce Township, 166 Mich. 550, 132 N.W. 114 (1911). 
DEFECT: Ridge of snow left on sidewalk by plowing. The ridge was 
covered with ice formed by runoff from adjacent building. 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff slipped on the ice and fell. 
INJURY: Broken leg. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Negligence 
Plaintiff claimed that defendant was negligent in allowing 
the ridge of snow to remain. 
C o u r t  s a i d :  T h e  c i t y  is l i a b l e  when i t  c a u s e s  
accumulations, not when a ridge is formed by removal of 
snow. 
a Pla in t i f f  claimed t h a t  defendant  was negligent in 
permitting ice to form on the ridge. 
Court said: The city was not responsible for the water 
coming onto the sidewalk and therefore was not negligent in 
failing to prevent the formation of ice. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $700 was reversed 




Jefferson v. City of Sault Ste. Marie, 166 Mich. 340, 130 N.W. 610 (19ll). 
Maint. -
DEFECT: Washout at bottom of a dirt road going downhill--travelers 
required to used one side of the road to avoid the washout. 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff drove his team over this section of the road early 
in the day and then checked the site for possible problems 
returning a t  night i n  t he  dark l a t e r  t h a t  day. Upon 
returning at  night plaintiff's wagon slipped into the washout 
severely injuring plaint if fls horse. 
INJURY: Property damage only. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Defenses 
Defendant claimed tha t  plaintiff  was contributorily 
negligent as a matter of law in driving over a road he 
knew was unsafe. 
Court said: Whether plaintiff was contributorily negligent 
was a question of fact for the jury's decision. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Supreme Court 
Highland v. Garfield Township, 168 Mich. 538, 134 N.W. 971 (1912). 
Eng., Maint Traffic 
-9 -
DEFECT: Absence of guardrail on narrow, highly crowned road; snow 
and ice on the road. 





Pla in t i f f  claimed tha t  defendant was negligent in 
constructing a narrow, crowned road with no guardrail. 
Court said: Although the defendant is not liable for natural 
accumulations of snow and ice, if a road is so constructed 
that it is safe only when free of snow and ice, defendant 
has failed to provide a reasonably safe road. Whether the 
road in this case was reasonably safe was a question of fact 
for the jury. 
RESULT: Directed verdict for defendant was reversed and the case 
was remanded for a new trial. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Supreme Court 
Stanton v. Webster Township, 170 Mich. 428, 136 N.W. 421 (1912). 
Eng., Maint., Traffic --
DEFECT: Absence of guardrail; icy road. 
ACCIDENT: Horse and sleigh slid off road. 
INJURY: Property damage. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Negligence 
Plaintiff claimed that defendant was negligent in failing 
to put a guardrail beside the road. 
Court said: Whether a guardrail was necessary to make the 
road reasonably safe was a question of fact for the jury to 
decide. 
Defenses 
Defendant claimed the icy condition of the road, rather 
than the lack of a guardrail ,  was the  cause of the  
acc i den t . 
C o u r t  sa id :  If the accident  was caused by the  icy 
condition, defendant was not liable. Whether it was the ice 
or the lack of a guardrail that caused the accident was a 
question of fact for the jury to decide. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed. 
COMMENT: NIA 
Supreme Court 
Lubbers v. Manlius Township, 172 Mich. 387, 137 N.W. 804 (1912). 
Eng., Traffic 
DEFECT: Dirt highway--fill bet ween two hills--roadway of varying 
widths with adjacent embankments-snow on the road, snow 
and sleet falling. 
ACCIDENT: Plantiff was driving a wagon with a load of poles across the 
fill. Apparently the wagon went down the embankment, 
tipping its load onto plaintiff. It also appeared that some 
time after the accident and during the storm plaintiff killed 




Plaintiff claimed that defendant had specific duties to 
make road approaches s t ra ight  and level,  to  make 
particular embankments level and of a safe width, and to 
guard the sides of a fill with barriers, guardrails or other 
structures. 
Court said: Defendant has no such specific duties, although 
its failure to do these things ar'e factors that a jury can 
consider as breach of its duty to keep/maintain. 
Defendant is not required to keep its highways absolutely 
safe for travel, and it is for the jury to decide whether a 
road is reasonably safe. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff was reversed and a new trial was 
ordered. 
COMMENT: Case turns largely on questions of proper jury instructions. 
Supreme Court 
Lamb -v. Clam Lake Township, 175 Mich. 77 ,  140 N.W. 1009 (1913). 
Eng., Traffic 
DEFECT: Fill on dirt road--bushes on one edge of road, hill on the 
other. 
ACCIDENT: Plaint iff drove his farm machinery over the fill-a separator 
trailing behind became skewed and toppled over the hill. 
INJURY: Property damage only. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Negligence 
r Proximate cause 
Court said: This accident occured because plaintiff failed 
to take precautions necessary to keep his separator properly 
behind his "engine." 
r Duty 
Court  sa id :  Ordinary care may sometimes require the 
construction of a railing by the sides of embankments but 
not where the  only highway problem is a fill since this 
condition is very widespread throughout the state and to base 
liability on a failure to guard it would impose an improper 
burden on municipalities. 
Defenses 
No notice 
Court said: Since many people had driven farm machinery 
over this area without mishap, and since no defec t  was 
visible either before or after the accident apart from the fill 
itself, there is no evidence of notice, 
Contributory negligence 
C o u r t  sa id :  The only negligence shown in the case is 
plaintiff's failure to be alert to his trailing seperator. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $100 was reversed 
and a new trial was ordered. 
COMMENT: A modern appeals  cour t  would be more likely to view these 
matters as questions of fact  for the jury's decision. 
Supreme Court 
Canfield v. Township of Gun Plains, 175 Mich. 379, 141 N.W. 634 (1913). 
Maint. -
DEFECT: Ridgeof ice and snow on sidewalk, formed by runoff from 
adjacent land. 




Plaintiff claimed defendant was negligent in failing to 
provide drainage for the runoff. 
Court said: The flow of water from melted snow is a 
natural flow and the city is not required to provide drainage 
for  i t .  Such a requirement would place an unwarranted 
burden on municipalities. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff  was reversed and the case was 
remanded for entry of judgment for defendant. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Supreme Court 
Mayo v. Village of Baraga, 178 Mich, 171, 144 N.W. 517 (1913). 
All -
DEFECT: Narrow s tep  on wooden sidewalk. 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff fell. 
INJURY: Broken leg. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Defense 
D e f e n d a n t  c l a i m e d  t h e  s i d e w a l k  w a s  n o t  wi thin  i t s  
jurisdiction. 
Court said: T h e  c o u n t y  is  not responsible for maintenance 
of sidewalks on county roads. 
RESULT: Judgment for defendant was affirmed. 
COMMENT: Modern l a w  c o n t i n u e s  t o  exc lude  s i d e w a l k s  f r o m  a r o a d  
com missionb responsibility. 
Supreme Court 
Ferguson v. Muskegon County, 181 Mich. 335, 148 N.W. 212 (1914). 
Eng., Traffic 
DEFECT: Absence of guardrail on road. 




Plaintiff claimed defendant was negligent in failing to 
erect a guardrail along the side of the road. 
Court said: As a matter of law, the duty to maintain a 
reasonably safe road does not require that a guardrail be 
erected along a road that is 14 feet wide, with no danger for 
30 feet beyond the edge of the road. 
Proximate cause 
Court said: The shying of plaintiff's horse, not the absence 
of a guardrail, was clearly the proximate cause of this 
accident. Defendant is not alleged to have caused the shying. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff was reversed and judgment for 
defendant will be entered. 
COMMENT: Court engages in extensive reweighing of the evidence. A 
modern appeals court would be more likely to leave such 
matters to the jury. 
Supreme Court 
Irwin v. Byron Township, 183 Mich. 345, 149 N.W. 980 (1914). -
Eng., Maint Permits, Traffic -* ' 
DEFECT: Sand and other material piled near the site of a recently 
constructed bridge--railings guarded both sides of the bridge 
but not the approach to the bridge. 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff drove his horse and buggy up the approach where 
the horse became frightened by the material piled to the 




Plaintiff tried to have testimony admitted showing an 
accident involving another team of horses becoming 
fr ightened by the  presence of this material before 
plaintiff's accident, but the trial court refused to admit 
this testimony. 
Court said: This testimony was properly excluded because 
the circumstances of the one accident (a team of horses one 
of which was admittedly wild) were quite different from 
plaintiff% circumstances (a single horse that was admittedly 
gentle). 
Plaintiff sought to admit testimony of another accident 
involving horses becoming frightened at the sight but was 
unable to s tate  whether this accident happened before or 
after plaintiff9 accident. 
Court said: Since this evidence could be of an accident 
after plaintiff9 accident, it cannot be admitted. 
Plaintiff claimed that defendant was negligent in leaving 
the material where it was rather than removing it. 
Court said: I t  was for the jury to decide whether it was 
negligent for defendant to leave this material close to the 
highway where it might frighten otherwise gentle horses. 
RESULT: Judgment for defendant was affirmed. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Supreme Court 
Boos -v. Northfield Township, 186 Mich. 386, 152 N.W. 1042 (1915). 
Eng., Maint Traffic " 
DEFECT: Absence of lights or bar r icades  in f ron t  of low bridge and 
shallow excavation on road. 





Court said: The driver knew the road was being worked on, 
but did not know t h e r e  was an excava t ion  behind t h e  low 
r idge  of d i r t .  Whether he was negligent in approaching this 
area a t  a speed of six or seven mph was a quest ion of f a c t  
for the jury to  decide. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Supreme Court 
Loose -v. Deerfield Township, 187 Mich. 206, 153 N.W. 913 (1915). 
Eng., Traffic 
DEFECT: Drawbridge opened to permit boat to pass  through with 
warning lights in place and operating, but a mechanical gate, 
which normally lowered across the road, failed to do so. 
ACCIDENT: P l a i n t i f f ,  a passenger in a vehicle, was killed when the 
vehicle drove into the opening on the bridge and fell into 




Defendan t  c la imed  t h a t  p la in t i f f  was contributorily 
negligent by ignoring t h e  warning l igh t s  and o t h e r  
devices--plaintiff claimed that  the absence of the gate 
was in invitation to cross the bridge because it was safe. 
Court said:  Whet her plaintiff was contributorily negligent 
was a question of fact for the jury's decision. 
No notice 
Court said:  Defendant's theory that the accident was due 
to a defective mechanism in t h e  br idge g a t e  and t h a t  
defendant had no notice of this defect  as the bridge had 
operated properly just prior to this accident is a reasonable 
theory and should have been submitted to the jury. 
I t  was improper for the  judge to exclude evidence proving 
these points. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $400 was reversed 
and a new trial ordered. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Supreme Court 
Beach v. City of St. Joseph, 192 Mich. 296, 158 N.W. 1045 (1916). 
Eng., Maint. -
DEFECT: Large depression a t  the  edge of a wooden br idge  * w h e r e  t h e  
planks joined the  road. 
ACCIDENT: P l a i n t i f f  d rove  his wagon loaded  with l u m b e r  and shingles 
over the  bridge. When t h e  wagon jo l t ed  down a t  t h e  e d g e  
t h e  p la in t i f f  was th rown f r o m  t h e  wagon and subsequently 
kicked by his horses. 
IN JURY: Broken knee--permanent crippling. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Defenses 
D e f e n d a n t  c l a i m e d  t h a t  p l a i n t i f f  was c o n t r i b u t o r i l y  
negligent for sitting on a l o o s e  pack  of sh ing les  and  f o r  
failing to  see  the  depression at the  edge of the  bridge. 
Court said: Whether p la int i f f  was c o n t r i b u t o r i l y  n e g l i g e n t  
was a question of fac t  for the  jury's decision. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff in t h e  amount of $1,500 was affirmed. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Supreme Court 
Pool v. Montague Township, 194 Mich. 476, 160 N.W. 549 (1916). -
Maint. -
DEFECT: Large hole in road-snow on the roadway-sharp dispute as to  
the location of the hole. 
ACCIDENT: The plaintiff drove his sleigh across the hole. Sleigh tipped 
over, throwing plaintiff and passengers out. 
INJURY:  Severe injury to back and hip. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Defenses 
Defendan t  claimed plaintiff had failed to provide the 
60-day notification. 
Court said: Such notification does not apply to a claim 
against townships. 
Defendan t  c la imed  t h a t  p la in t i f f  was contributorily 
negligent as a matter of law since plaintiff knew about 
the  existence of the hole, had driven over it earlier in 
the morning, and had been warned by his passenger to be 
alert for it the night of the accident. 
Court said: Whether plaintiff was contributorily negligent 
under the circumstance was a question of fact for the jury's 
decision. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $5,000 was affirmed. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Supreme Court 
McIntyre v. Grant Township, 206 Mich. 228, 172 N.W. 564 (1919). 
DEFECT: Washouts at the  edge of a dir t  road running down an 
embankment. 
ACCIDENT: Plaint i f f  was riding atop a large hay wagon. The load 
shifted on encountering the washout and plaintiff was thrown 
down the embankment. 




Defendant claimed tha t  the proximate cause of the 
accident was the poor loading of the straw and not any 
problem with the condition of the road and in fact denied 
that there was any hole at the site of the accident. 
C o u r t  said: Both parties presented evidence supporting 
their different points of view on the condition of the road 
and the  cause of the  accident. Therefore, these were 
questions of fact for the jury's decision. 
Defenses 
Defendant claimed tha t  plaintiff  was contributorily 
negligent as a matter of law for riding on top of a load 
of slippery straw. 
Court said: Highways are made for use by farmers as well 
as others and it cannot be said that one should not ride upon 
a load of straw without assuming all risk of accident because 
of a defective highway. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $850 was affirmed. 
COMMENT: The case is largely concerned with issues of proper jury 
instructions. 
Supreme Court 
Vinton v. Plainfield Township, 208 Mich. 179, 175 N.W. 403 (1919). 
Maint -* Permits 
DEFECT: A large private quarry excavated across a road; the road was 
legally closed, bu t  substantial barriers were not erected to 
close it physically, 






C o u r t  sa id :  Defendant unquestionably had a duty to 
effectively close the road and prevent public travel on it  
after it permitted the entire road to be excavated. 
Defenses 
Defendant claimed tha t  plaintiff  was contributorily 
negligent by drinking just prior to this accident, by failing 
to see the approaching cliff even though it was still light 
outside, and by ignoring the signs of quarry work being 
done in the area. 
Court said: The evidence on these points was conflicting 
and whether they amount to contributory negligence was a 
question of fact for the jury's decision. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $2,500 was affirmed. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Supreme Court 
Jewel1 v. Rogers Township, 208 Mich. 318, 175 N.W. 151 (1919). 
DEFECT: Washout or gully running across an unpaved road. 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff's horse shied at  the washout or gully and threw 




Defendant claimed tha t  the  proximate cause of the 
accident was the horse's becoming frightened by the noise 
of a nearby cement mixer rather than by any defect in 
the road. 
Court said: Several township officials inspected the road at 
regular intervals and several nearby residents indicated that 
the washout was present at the site. Therefore, whether 
defendant had notice of the defect was a question of fact 
for the jury's decision. 
Defendant claimed that there was no washout or gully at the 
place of the accident--in response plaintiff claimed tha t  
there was a washout or gully at the place of the accident. 
Court said: This conflict in the testimony is a question for  
the jury's decision. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $2,500 was affirmed, 
COMMENT: N/A 
Supreme Court 
Burns -v. Van Buren Township, 218 Mich. 40, 187 N.W. 276 (1922). 
Maint Traffic .' 
DEFECT: Unlighted barricade across road where bridge was out. 




Plaintiff claimed defendant was negligent in failing to 
mark the barricade. 
Court said: When a road detours to a temporary bridge, 
the road is closed at the point of detour within the meaning 
of the statute requiring that a barricade closing a road be 
marked with red lights. Failure to use those lights was 
negligence. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed. 
COMMENT: The rule today is that failure to comply with a statute is 
not automatically negligence, but creates a presumption that 
the road authority was negligent. 
Supreme Court 
Jones v. Brookfield Township, 221 Mich. 235, 190 N.W. 733 (1922). -
Maint -* 9 Traffic 
DEFECT: Ruts across a dirt road guarded by a decayed guardrail. 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff  lost control of his vehicle at  the ruts, crashed 
through the guardrail, and rolled down a Rill. 




Court said: Photographs showing a much improved guardrail 
erected at the site after the accident were not admissible 
without a jury instruction guarding against the use of the 
testimony as an admission of defendant's negligence. 
Absence of accidents 
Court said: Evidence of the lack of prior accidents is not 
admissible to show absence of negligence. 
Defenses 
6 No notice 
Court said: Evidence showing the condition of the highway 
for several months before the accident was admissible to 
show that township officials should have known of the defect. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $1,500 was reversed 
and a new trial was ordered. 
COMMENT: The court observed that the defendant cannot construct a 
dangerous and unsafe road and shield itself behind its 
power to adopt a plan and method of building. Modern 
law makes road authorities liable for negligent design. 
Case turns largely on evidentiary rules rather than on 
principles of road liability. 
Supreme Court 
La Due v. Lebanon Township, 222  Mich. 301, 192 N.W. 636 (1923). 
Eng., Maint., Traffic -
DEFECT: Insufficient barrier to swing bridge--sleet and freezing rain 
falling. 





Plaintiff claimed defendant was negligent in failing to 
erect a barrier strong enough to stop a car, failing to 
p r o v i d e  a d e q u a t e  l ighting, and permit t ing ice  to  
accurulate. 
Court said: It would be ftmanifestly absurdv to require a 
barrier strong enough to stop a car. 
The ordinary street lighting was sufficient, and plaintiff knew 
the swing bridge was there. 
The city was not required to guard against sleet or freezing 
rain making the road slippery. 
RESULT: Directed verdict for defendant was affirmed, 
COMMENT: N/A 
Supreme Court 
Gerrie v. City of Port Huron, 226 Mich. 630, 198 N.W. 236 (1924). 
Enz.. Traffic 
DEFECT: Absence of barrier, flooded road. 




Plaintiff claimed defendant was negligent in building a 
creek culvert with insufficient capacity for spring floods. 
Court said: Defendant is not liable for unusual flooding, 
but is liable if it causes flooding and is liable for failing to 
build a culvert capable of handling ordinary seasonal flooding. 
Defendant must take notice of the repeated flow of water 
and note whether the flood is caused by the bridge acting as 
a dam for an ordinary accumulation of water. 
What constitutes an unusual flood is a question of fact for 
the jury's decision. 
Plaintiff claimed defendant was negligent in failing to 
install barriers along the road over the culvert. 
Court said: Whether the duty to provide reasonably safe 
roads required the installation of barriers was a question of 
fact for the jury. 
RESULT: Judgment for defendant was reversed and the case was 
remanded for new trial. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Supreme Court 
Fidler v. Lafayette Township, 226 Mich. 635, 198 N.W. 262 (1924). 
Eng., Traffic 
DEFECT: Absence of guardrail on embankment. 
ACCIDENT: Horse-drawn farm wagon, being driven in the rain at night, 
on an unfamiliar road, slid off road and down embankment. 
INJURY: Unspecified-said to be severe. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Negligence 
Plaintiff claimed that the failure to install a guardrail 
along embankment was negligent. 
Court said: The defendant was required to keep the road 
reasonably safe and fit for public travel. Whet her defendant 
was negligent in failing to erect a barrier was a question for 
the jury. 
Defense 
Defendant claimed plaintiff was contributorily negligent. 
Court said: Plaintiff had a right to assume the highway 
was in a reasonably safe condition, and was paying close 
attention to the road. 
Whether plaintiff was negligent was a question of fact for 
jury to decide in all the circumstances. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Supreme Court 
Carpenter v, Bloomingdale Township, 227 Mich. 355, 198 N.W. 912 (1924). 
Eng,, Maint -* 9 Traffic 
DEFECT: Absence of guardrail along road on fill; erosion of bank, 
leaving ruts and gullies in surface. 




Plaintiff claimed defendant was negligent in failing to 
erect a guardrail along the road on the fill. 
Court said: Whether the road was reasonably safe without 
a guardrail was a question of fact for the jury. 
Defenses 
Defendant's engineer testified that the road was built 
according to the usual plans and customs employed in 
such work, 
Court said: The question was not what the custom was, 
but whether the road was reasonably safe. 
Defendant claimed plaintiff's husband (deceased) was 
negligent in seizing and jerking the wheel of the car on 
encountering ruts on the road. 
Court said: Whether this act made defendant guilty of 
contributory negligence was a question of fact for the jury's 
decision. 
RESULT: Judgment for defendant was affirmed. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Court of Appeals 
Mazzolini v, Kalamazoo County, 228 Mich. 59, 199 N.W. 648 (1924). 
Maint. -
DEFECT: Cap on water outlet in sidewalk-cement around the  cap  
depressed, leaving cap protruding above the surface. 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff caught her foot on the cap and fell. 




Court said: Plaintiff must prove constructive or actual 
notice unless the defect existed for thirty days. If t h e  
defect existed for thirty days, notice is conclusively presumed. 
Since all of the evidence in this case tended to show that 
t h e  de fec t  had exis ted for more than thirty days, and 
defendant's only response was to deny the existence of a 
defect at  all, plaintiff was not required to prove actual or 
constructive notice. Since the trial judge instructed the jury 
that plaintiff was required to prove actual or constructive 
notice in the  f a c t s  of this case ,  the  ins t ruc t ion  was 
erroneous and requires reversal. 
RESULT: Judgment for defendant was reversed and a new trial was 
ordered. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Suprem e Court 
Wilkinson v. City of Grand Rapids, 228 Mich. 120, 199 N.W. 600 (1924). 
Enrr.. Traffic 
DEFECT: Absence of guardrails on a road over a fill. 





Plaintiff claimed defendant had a duty to erect fences or 
guardrails or display signals or lights warning of t h e  
dangerous condition of the road. 
Court  said: Whether guardrails or danger signals were 
necessary to  discharge the duty to keeplmaintain was a 
question of fact for the jury's decision. 
RESULT: Judgment for defendant was affirmed. 
COMMENT: Defendant was permitted to introduce evidence showing 
that at  the time of the accident the road was a state 
trunk line highway; that it was subsequently taken over 
by the road com mission; and at the time of the accident 
was being rebuilt and improved by the  s t a t e .  The 
plaintiff objected to this evidence. The court noted that 
since the trial court had clearly instructed the jury that 
the road commission would be liable for breach of the 
duty to keeplmaintain, admission of this evidence was 
acceptable .  The court  did not directly discuss the 
implication of this evidence on jurisdiction over the road. 
The court  noted tha t  t he re  was evidence tha t  the 
plaintiff's vehicle traveled some distance beyond t h e  
defect in question before going over the embankment. 
Supreme Court 
White -v. Livingston Countx, 229 Mich. 153, 200 N.W. 973 (1924). 
Maint. -
DEFECT: Horse-drawn snowplow went over a wooden sidewalk and the 
horses1 hooves broke through hard-packed snow made by 
pedestrians previously traveling over the walk, thus leaving a 
series of holes six to twelve inches deep. 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff walked over t h e  sidewalk in an a rea  of poor 
lighting, stepped in one of the holes and fell. 
INJURY: Broken leg; plaintiff was also pregnant, feared damage to her 
unborn child, but none occurred. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Defenses 
Defendant claimed that the notification provided to the 
city council was deficient in not precisely naming the 
place of the accident, the nature of the defect, and the 
names of witnesses. 
Court said: Since defendant made use of notification to 
investigate the claim and decided to refuse the claim, i t  
cannot now complain t h a t  the  notification was legally 
defective. 
No notice 
Court  said: When as here the  dangerous condition is 
created by defendant's own agents in the course of their 
work, defendant's liability is not based on notice and failure 
to repair but upon the creation of the dangerous condition, 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff was reversed and a new trial was 
ordered. 
COMMENT: Note that modern law requires the plaintiff always to 
prove notice, even when the defendant created the defect. 
The case was reversed for reasons unrelated to principles 
of road liability-improper jury instructions on the issue 
of mental anguish concerning possible miscarriage. 
Supreme Court 
Nevala v. City of Ironwood, 232 Mich. 316, 205 N.W. 93 (1925). 
DEFECT: Accumulation of ice in a depression in sidewalk. 




Plaintiff claimed tha t  the  depression made the sidewalk 
unsafe. 
Court said: The city was not liable for a depression in the 
sidewalk. Neither was it  liable for the natural accumulation 
of ice in the depression. 
RESULT: Judgment for the  plaintiff was reversed and the  case was 
remanded for entry of judgment for defendant. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Supreme Court 
Hopson v. City of Detroit, 235 Mich. 248, 209 N.W. 161 (1926). 
Eng., Traffic 
DEFECT: Dirt road--ten to eleven feet wide with a sloping sand 
embankment and no guardrails. 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff drove his horse and buggy over the road; the horse 






Court said: Defendant does not have an absolute duty to 
place guardrails nor can it be said that the traveled portion 
of the road was too narrow. To base liability upon a failure 
to guard a road of this type would improse upon defendant a 
greater duty than the statute imposes. 
RESULT: Judgment for the defendant was affirmed. 
COMMENT: Note that a modern court is more likely to permit a jury to 
consider as negligence defendant's failure to widen a road or 
to install railings or barriers. 
Supreme Court 
Vose -v. Richland Township, 242 Mich. 46, 217 N.W. 784 (1928). 
Eng., Maint. -
DEFECT: Planks laid over wet cement either as a temporary crosswalk 
during street construction or as a temporary landing for 
streetcar passengers; nail projecting through a plank. 





Court said: Considering the inconspicuous character of the 
alleged defect and that the plank had been put in place not 
more than forty-eight hours before the accident, there was 
not sufficient t ime for defendant to  be charged with 
constructive notice of the unsafe condition, nor was there 
any proof of actual notice, 
RESULT: Directed verdict for defendant was affirmed. 
COMMENT: The case also discusses whether the planks in question were 
placed by the defendant city or by the railroad company. 
The court concludes that for a jury to decide this matter 
would be merely conjecture, Modern cases would hold a 
defendant liable for neglecting to repair or remove defects 
placed by third parties. 
Supreme Court 
Moblo -v. City of Lansing, 243 Mich. 465, 220 N.W. 890 (1928). 
Maint. -
DEFECT: Wire cable strung to prevent pedestrian access to grass area 
between sidewalk and s t r e e t ;  cable sagged adjacent to 
sidewalk; light snowfall made the cable nearly invisible, 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff stepped from sidewalk onto grass area, tripped on 
the cable, and fell. 




Court  said: Defendant's duty to keeplmaintain includes 
keeping the entire highway (including sidewalks) safe and fi t  
for travel including removing obstructions. 
Defendant cannot confine citizens to a "traffic groove" but 
must anticipate their departure from established walkways 
and must maintain a reasonably safe and convenient condition 
where people can be expected to go. 
The statutory duty to keeplmaintain the physical highway 
does not relieve defendant of liability for defects outside of 
the roadbed itself. 
Defendant has the right to guard its grass areas but may not 
employ dangerous instrumentalities to do so. 
Whether the sagging cable in this case was a reasonable 
guard for the grass a rea  or was a dangerous t r ap  for 
pedestrians, and whether the condition of the wire breached 
defendant's &ty to keeplmaintain was a question of fact for 
the jury's decision. 
RESULT: Dismissal of plaintiff's complaint was reversed and the case 
was rem anded. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Supreme Court 
Jablonski v. City of Bay City, 248 Mich. 306, 226 N.W. 865 (1929). 
Maint -* 7 Permits, Traffic 
DEFECT: Large drain excavation in street preceded by a section of 
minor road repairs--excavation not guarded by lights or 
barricade but just ahead of the excavation was a barricade 
was placed by defendant's contractor as required by its 
permit from defendant road com mission. 
ACCIDENT: While the weather was wet and dark plaintiff came through 
the area of minor street repair and while avoiding a piece of 
contruction machinery, ran into the large drain excavation. 
INJURY: One death and several other injuries. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Defenses 
a Defendants claimed that the barrier was sturdy, visible, 
and as a matter of law sufficient to keep motorists from 
driving into the excavation. Plaintiff claimed that the 
barricade was inadequate. 
Court said: The adequacy of the barricade was a question 
of fact for the jury's decision. 
Defendants claimed tha t  plaintiff was contributorily 
negligent as a matter of law in that he did not keep a 
proper lookout for the excavation. 
Court said: In considering plaintiff's contributory negligence 
one must keep in mind tha t  the  repairs preceding the 
excavation were minor in nature, had similar barricades, and 
lacked warning lights. Therefore, plaintiff could easily have 
assumed that the barricade ahead of the drain marked a 
similarly minor road repair area. 
Plaintiff has no duty to  ant ic ipa te  an unguarded and 
unlighted excavation. Therefore, whether plaintiff was 
contributorily negligent was a question of fact for the jury's 
decision. 
No jurisdiction (defendant city) 
Court said: Jurisdiction over this road was transferred to 
the  road commission, which issued the permit for the 
excavation as done by the contractor. Theref ore, defendant 
city does not have jurisdiction and cannot be liable to the 
plaintiff. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff aff irmed as t o  defendant contractor 
(Mercier) and revesed as to defendant city. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Supreme Court 
Martin v. J.A. Mercier Company, and Ci ty  of Lincoln Park, 255 Mich. 
587,338 N.W. 181 (1931). 
Eng., Maint. -
DEFECT: Depression on unpaved street about eight to twelve inches 
deep and five to six feet long. 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff was a passenger in a taxi cab, and was injured 
when the cab struck the depression. 
INJURY: Said to be serious. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: D edenses 
Defendant city claimed that the street in question was in 
no worse condition than a country road. 
Court said: The fact that a country road may not be kept 
in reasonable repair does not excuse defendant  for i t s  
neglect to keep its streets in reasonable repair. 
0 Defendant claimed plaintiff was contributorily negligent 
since she was familiar with the bumpy condition of the 
street and said only to the taxi driver that Ifit was rough.lf 
Court said: Whether her neglect to give the driver more 
warning was contributory negligence was a question of fact 
for the jury's decision. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $9,000 was affirmed. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Supreme Court 
Parker v. Kettinger, and City of Monroe, 257 Mich. 385, 241 N.W. 226 
(1932). 
Eng., Maint. -
DEFECT: Bump at edge of bridge where it joined the road. 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff drove over the bump, was thrown to the floor, lost 





The t r ia l  court  directed a verdict in favor of the 
defendant because plaintiff was driving at a speed that 
made it impossible to stop within the assured cleared 
distance ahead and could not see objects ahead of him. 
Court said: Plaintiff 's  theory of the case is that the 
accident was caused by the bump at the edge of the bridge, 
and plaintiff's ability either to see the bump or to stop 
within a certain distance is irrelevant to the cause of the 
accident as alleged. 
In addition, the rule requiring a driver to be able to stop 
within the assured cleared distance ahead applies only to 
objects in the road other than the road itself. 




Marek -v. City of Alpena, 258 Mich. 637, 242 N.W. 793 (1932). 
Maint.. Traffic 
DEFECT: Traffic light pole in the middle of an intersection. 




P l a i n t i f f  c laimed defendant breached i t s  duty to 
keep/maintain by placing the pole in the center of the 
street. 
Court said: The ci ty is not liable for the ice on the 
street. Posts are commonly used at  intersections and are 
conspicuous, so it is not negligence to use them. 
RESULT: The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount 
of $5,250, which the judge refused to accept and on appeal 
he was affirmed. 
COMMENT: A modern appeals court would be more likely to reinstate a 
jury verdict. 
Supreme Court 
Clark -v. Village of Chelsea, 269 Mich. 422, 257 N.W. 728 (1934). 
Traffic 
DEFECT: Trolley car safety island in center  of s t reet--red l ight  
warn ing  of i t s  presence out ,  but  o the r  s t r e e t  l ights  
functioning. 
ACCIDENT: Collision between vehicle and trolley car safety island. 
INJURY: Driver and passengers seriously injured. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Notice 
Plaintiff claimed that testimony of one witness that the 
light was out, of another witness that i t  ?'seemed" to  
have been out the previous night, and of a city policeman 
t h a t  t he  l ight was out just prior to  acc ident  was 
sufficient to prove notice. 
Court said: Notice to policeman was not notice to the city 
as the policeman was not a highway officer responsible for 
the condition. 
Despite evidence showing notice, there was not reasonable 
time to repair the defect. 
RESULT: Judgment for the defendant was affirmed. 
COMMENT: Court engages in extensive weighing of the parties? evidence. 
A modern appeals court would be less likely to redetermine 
findings of fact. 
Supreme Court 
Jones v. City of Lansing, 273 Mich. 623, 263 N.W. 757 (1935). -
Maint. -
DEFECT: Upheaval in sidewalk due t o  r o o t s  of n e a r b y  t r e e ;  
accumulation of ice and snow. 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff slipped and fell. 
INJURY: Broken leg. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Negligence 
Plaintiff claimed the defendant was negligent in failing to 
repair the sidewalk. 
Court  sa id :  Defendant is not liable if the injury was 
caused solely by ice and snow. 
Defendant is liable for failure to repair the sidewalk and its 
negligence is apparent. 
Defenses 
Defendant claimed plaintiff was contributorily negligent. 
Court said: Plaintiff knew of the defect, was aware of i t  
a t  .the time, and was not prevented from walking around it, 
Therefore, she was contributorily negligent as a matter of 
law. 
RESULT: Judgment for defendant was affirmed. 
COMMENT: A modern court would be more likely to leave the question 
of contributory negligence to the jury. 
Supreme Court 
Johnson v. City of Pontiac, 276 Mich. 103, 267 N.W. 795  (1936). 
Permits 
DEFECT: Drain excavation across highway-sharp depression where part 
of the drain was being built. 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff encountered the depression, lost control of his car, 
and drove into a ditch. 
INJURY: Severe partial paralysis. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Negligence 
Plaintiff claimed that defendant had failed to properly 
supervise the construction area or to provide adequate 
warnings of the dangerous condition of the highway. 
Court said: Defendant's contractor had placed flags but 
the re  were removed a t  the  day of this accident  and 
defendant's contractor employed a patrolman to observe the 
condition of the road and protect the public. In addition, 
many witnesses tes t i f ied  t o  the  bumpy nature  of the  
construction area. Therefore, there was evidence from which 
the jury could find that the road was out of repair and that 
defendant had notice of the problem and an opportunity to 
correct it. 
Defenses 
Defendant claimed tha t  plaintiff  was contributorily 
negligent by driving at an excessive speed. 
Court sa id :  While some witnesses estimated plaintiff's 
speed at 60 to 80 mph, other witnesses estimated it a t  40 
mph. Therefore,  it was for the jury to decide whether 
plaintiff was speeding and, i f  so, whether the  speeding 
amounted to contributory negligence. 




v. Ingham County, 277 Mich. 345, 269 N.W. 197 (1936). 
Eng., Maint. -
DEFECT: Water main leaking water onto road-wate~ froze, forming a 
barrier of ice one to two feet high. 




Defendant claimed tha t  plaintiff  was contributorily 
negligent by attempting to travel over the road and not 
heeding lights along the  side of the road indicating 
dangerous conditions. 
Court said: Since the lights to the side of the road were 
not intended to wan of the ice barrier across the road, it 
should not be assumed that plaintiff was to take them as a 
warning about the barrier. In addition, even if the plaintiff 
knew about the the generally dangerous condition of the 
road, he was still entitled to drive over it using due care. 
Therefore,  whether plaintiff was contributorily negligent 
under these circumstances is a question of fact for the jury's 
decision. 
RESULT: The jury returned a verdict in the amount of $8,000 in favor 
of plaintiff but the trial court directed a verdict in favor of 
defendant. The supreme court reversed the direction of the 
trial court and reinstated the original verdict. 
COMMENT: The court noted that defendant knew of the ice barrier on 
the road and had ample time to remedy the problem but did 
not do so; nor did defendant close the road, 
Supreme Court 
Brown v. Oakland County, 279 Mich. 55, 271 N.W. 550 (1937). 
Traffic 
DEFECT: T-intersection-three wooden posts marking end of the road; 
dispute as to whether central post was in place at the time 
of the accident. 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle that approached the 
T-intersection at night. Vehicle drove straight ahead into a 
ditch, 
INJURY: Said to be severe. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Negligence 
Plaintiff claimed that the center post was missing and 
that its absence was a breach of defendant's duty t o  
keeplmaintain. In response, defendant claimed the post 
was not missing. 
Court said: Whether the post was missing was a question 
of fact for the jury's decision. 
Since the trial court found the central post to be missing it 
follows that defendant failed to discharge its duty. The two 
remaining posts could easily have been taken to mark 
hazards by the side of the road if the road continued, rather 
than indicating the end of the road. 
Defendant denied that it had a duty to keep guardrails 
erected and maintained, 
Court said: Defendant admitted this duty in its answer to 
plaintiff's complaint and cannot raise the question on appeal. 
Defenses 
Defendant claimed that plaintiff's contributory negligence 
was the sole proximate cause of the accident. 
Court  sa id :  Evidence presented did not indicate the 
plaintiff was behaving improperly, and therefore, whether 
plaintiff was contributorily negligent was a question of fact 
for the jury's decision. From the following evidence the jury 
could infer that plaintiff was not contributorily negligent. 
- The posts were not clearly visible at night. 
- Plaintiff's speed was between 25 and 30 mph. 
- An open field lay behind the end of the road, and 
plaintiff's headlights would not have revealed any 
obstacle indicating that the road came to an end. 
- Although plaintiff was somewhat familiar with the  
area, he was unfamiliar with the particular intersection. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed. 
COMMENT: Case presents considerable measurement detail of the 
roadway in question. 
Supreme Court 
Maxson v. Bay County, 290 Mich. 86, 287 N.W. 389 (1939). 
Maint Po' Traffic 
DEFECT: Utility pole rot ted  at t h e  base, 
ACCIDENT: Thir teen-year-old  boy c r o s s e d  t h e  s t r e e t  by t h e  pole, which 




D e f e n d a n t  c l a i m e d  t h a t  i t s  po le  was  p a r t  of i t s  s t r ee t  
lighting system and tha t  i t  was immune f r o m  l i a b i l i t y  f o r  
t h i s  func t ion .  In response ,  p la in t i f f  c l a i m e d  t h a t  t h e  
d e f e c t i v e  p o l e  was a highway d e f e c t  i n c l u d e d  w i t h i n  
defendant's duty t o  keep/maintain. 
Court said: T h e  po le  a d j a c e n t  t o  t h e  s t r e e t  is l i k e  a n y  
n e a r b y  o b s t r u c t i o n  and  inc luded  wi thin  defendant 's  duty t o  
keep/maintain because defects  in s u c h  s t r u c t u r e s  r e n d e r  t h e  
highway unsafe. 
Defendant claimed tha t  t h e  verdict was excessive. 
Court said: Since t h e  verdict is wi thin  a r e a s o n a b l e  r a n g e  
and  s u p p o r t e d  by s o m e  e v i d e n c e  i t  will not be disturbed on 
appeal. 
RESULT: J u d g m e n t  f o r  p l a i n t i f f  in  t h e  a m o u n t  of $2,864.95 was 
a f f i rmed .  
COMMENT: T h e  c o u r t  obse rved  t h a t  t h e  po le  in q u e s t i o n  had been  in 
place for twenty years and t h e r e  was no r e c o r d  of i t s  e v e r  
having been inspected prior t o  this accident. 
Supreme Court  
Rufner v. Traverse City, 296 Mich. 204, 295 N.W. 620 (1941). 
DEFECT: Tree in median at the point where the road divided. 




Defendant claimed plaintiff was contributorily negligent in 
failing to see the tree. 
Court said: Plaint if fls failure to make proper observation 
was contributory negligence as a matter of law and the  
proximate cause of the accident. 
RESULT: Directed verdict for defendant was affirmed. 
COMMENT: A modern court would be more likely to let the jury decide 
whether the plaintiff was contributorily negligent. 
Supreme Court 
Burke -v. Washtenaw County, 301 Mich. 666, 4 N.W.2d 50 (1942). 
Eng., Maint. -
DEFECT: An uncovered catch basin. 




Defendant  c laimed t h a t  plaint i f f  had not  complied with 
the 60-day notification requi rement ,  by fai l ing t o  not i fy  
the county clerk, and therefore suit was barred. 
Court said: The requirement is mandatory ,  and present ing  
t h e  claim t o  t h e  Board of Road Commissioners rather than 
the county clerk was not sufficient. 
RESULT: Dismissal of plaintiff's complaint was affirmed. 
COMMENT: Note t h a t  60-day not i f ica t ion  provision has been rep laced  
with a 120-day provision, and t h a t  failure to provide it will 
not bar a suit unless defendant is actually prejudiced. 
Supreme Court 
Braun -v, Wayne County, 303 Mich. 454, 6 N.W.2d 744 (1942). 
All -
DEFECT: Tree protruding halfway into shoulder adjacent to paved road. 




a Defendant claimed that the shoulder and the tree were 
not on the portion of the highway designed for vehicular 
t r ave l  and therefore  not included within its duty to 
keeplmaintain. 
Court said: While the shoulder is designed for vehicular 
travel of some sort it is not on the portion of the  road 
included within defendant's duty to keep/maintain and for 
failing to remove a t ree adjacent to or on the shoulder, 
therefore, defendant cannot be liable. 
RESULT: Judgent for plaintiff was reversed. 
COMMENT: Note that modern cases s ta te  that the shoulder of the road 
is on the improved portion of the highway designed for  
vehicular travel and is therefore subject to defendant's duty 
to keep/maintain. 
Supreme Court 
Goodrich v. Kalamazoo County, 304 Mich. 442, 8 N.W.2d 130 (1943). 
DEFECT: Large log or tree limb on road. 




D e f e n d a n t  c l a i m e d  t h a t  i t  d id  n o t  h a v e  n o t i c e  of t h e  
d e f e c t  . 
Court  s a i d :  T h e  l imb,  14 t o  20  i n c h e s  in d i a m e t e r ,  had 
been on t h e  road within one and 1 112 miles of a v i l l age ,  f o r  
m o r e  t h a n  t w o  days.  T h e s e  f a c t s  a r e  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  make 
defendant's negligence a question of f a c t  for t h e  jury. 
D e f e n d a n t  claimed t h a t  t h e  driver was negligent in failing 
t o  see t h e  t r e e  limb. 
C o u r t  s a i d :  W h e t h e r  t h e  d r i v e r  w a s  n e g l i g e n t  was a 
question of f a c t  for t h e  jury. 
RESULT: J u d g m e n t  f o r  d e f e n d a n t  was  r e v e r s e d  and  t h e  case was 
remanded for new trial. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Supreme Court  
Holland v. Allegan County, 316 Mich. 134, 25 N.W. 140 (1946). 
Maint. -
DEFECT: Manhole  c o v e r  p r o t r u d i n g  f r o m  s u r f a c e  of unpaved pub l ic  
a l l e y .  
ACCIDENT: P l a i n t i f f ,  a passenger  in a car, drove over t h e  manhole and 




D e f e n d a n t  c l a i m e d  t h a t  i t s  duty t o  keeplmaintain did not 
include public alleys. 
Court s a i d :  S i n c e  d e f e n d a n t ' s  c i t y  c h a r t e r  r e q u i r e d  
maintenance of a l l e y s  and s i n c e  d e f e n d a n t  had u n d e r t a k e n  
t h e  upkeep  and  m a i n t e n a n c e  of t h e s e  al leys for some t ime  
and had maintained them for use as public alleys, de fendan t ' s  
duty t o  keeplmaint ain includes such public alleys. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff in the  amount of $2,500 was affirmed. 
COMMENT: N o t e  t h a t  t h e  p r e s e n t  s t a t u t e  s p e c i f i c a l l y  exc ludes  alleys 
from the  duty to  keeplmaintain. 
Supreme Court  
Pyman v. Ci ty  of Grand Rapids, 327 Mich. 543, 42 N.W.2d 739 (1950). 
Eng., Permits, Traffic 
DEFECT: Stop sign removed and not replaced by con t rac to r  a t  
intersection. 





Plaintiff claimed that testimony concerning the practices 
in Ottawa County for the removal and replacement of 
stop signs should not have been admitted. 
Court said: Such evidence should not have been admitted 
because custom cannot change the statutory duty relating to 
signs. However, the error was not prejudicial to plaintiff. 
RESULT: The jury returned a verdict for defendant but the trial judge 
granted a new trial. The supreme court, however, reinstated 
the original verdict in favor of defendant. 
COMMENT: Note that there is no public road authority involved in 
t h e  case  although the contractor was retained by the 
Ottawa County Road Commission. The absence of the 
r o a d  commission as a par ty to  t h e  lawsuit  is not 
explained in the case. 
The case  is largely concerned with evidentiary points 
unrelated to road liability. 
Supreme Court 
Hoag v. Hyzy, 339 Mich. 163, 63 N.W.2d 632 (1954). 
Maint. -
DEFECT: Cracked and crumbling sidewalk due to underlying tree roots. 
ACCIDENT: At night plaintiff walked over the sidewalk, tripped on the 
crumbled portion, and fell. 
INJURY: Said to be serious-eye injury. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Defenses 
Defendant claimed that plaintiff's notification of injury 
mentioned only a depression in the sidewalk and her 
stumbling on account of the depression, while her claim 
as proven at  trial was that the sidewalk defect was a 
trap that caught her foot. Defendant claimed that this 
variance between the notification given and the claim 
proven at  trial, meant that the notification given was 
defective and that, therefore, plaintiff's claim was barred. 
Court said: This variation is substantial and means that 
plaintiff's case lacks the necessary starting point required by 
the notification of injury and that, therefore, the claim is 
barred. 
RESULT: The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, which the judge 
refused to accept, and on appeal the judge was affirmed. 
COMMENT: The case  illustrates the rare circumstance in modern 
times in which a trial judge refuses to accept the verdict 
of the jury and is affirmed on appeal. 
Note tha t  fa i lure  to provide t i m e l y  or  a d e q u a t e  
notification of the defect no longer bars plaintiff's suit 
unless defendant is actually prejudiced. 
Supreme Court 
Rottschafer v, City of East G r a n d  342 Mich. 43, 69 N.W.2d 193 
71955). 
Maint. 
DEFECT: Loose and broken cement on sidewalk. 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff stepped on the broken cement and fell. 
INJURY: Fractured wrist and other lesser injuries. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Defenses 
Defendant claimed that since plaintiff was aware of the 
broken place on the sidewalk but went over it anyway she 
was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. 
Court said: A person's awareness of the existence of a 
defect is one fact to be taken into consideration by a jury 
in determining whether the person was guilty of carelessness 
or negligence. 
A person is not precluded from traveling over a highway or 
sidewalk simply because he knows there is a defect in it. 
Defendant claimed that plaintiff's statutory notification 
was inadequate. 
Court said: Identifying the location in front of which the 
broken portion of sidewalk lay and referring to the sidewalk 
as llbrokenll provided sufficient notification of the defect and 
injury especially when there was no substantial variance 
between the claim as set forth in the statutory notification 
and the claims made at trial. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $2,000 was affirmed. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Supreme Court 
Cloutier v. City of Owosso, 343 Mich. 238, 72  N.W.2d 46 (1955). 
All -
DEFECT: Unspecified. 
ACCID ENT: Head-on collision. 
INJURY: Said to be serious. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Defenses 
Defendant claimed tha t  the suit was filed after the 
expiration of the two-year statute of limitations. In  
response the plaintiff claimed that the suit was controlled 
by the three-year statute of limitations on general tort 
lawsuits. 
Court said: All lawsuits brought against the road authority 
for breach of the duty to keeplmaintain are controlled by 
the two-year statute of limitations. 
RESULT: Dismissal of plaintiff% complaint was affirmed. 
COMMENT: Case contains considerable discussion of principles of 
statutory interpretation. 
Supreme Court 
~ f a f f  v. Board of County Road Commissioners of Ogemaw County, 354 
Mich. 575, 93 N.W.2d 244 (1958). 
Maint., Permits 
DEFECT: Clothesline strung across sidewalk. 






Court said: Plaintiff must always prove constructive or 
actual notice and a reasonable time in which to repair the 
defect. 
Whether defendant had the required notice is a question of 
fact for the jury's decision. 
From the following evidence it would be possible for a jury 
to conclude that the defendant had notice: 
The clothesline had been strung up on washdays 
intermittently for eighteen years. 
City police officers had occasionally driven on 
the street. 
A police officer testified that if he had seen the 
line he would have ordered the adjacent property 
owner to remove it. 
Other residents of the area knew that the line 
was frequently strung on washdays. 
When the line was hung with wash, it was readily 
visible. 
Defendant's claim tha t  to  detect the clothesline would 
require constant police patrol of a sparsely settled area is a 
fact which the jury can consider in finding notice, but does 
not mean that as a matter of law there was no notice. 
RESULT: The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff which 
the trial judge refused to accept and entered judgment in  
favor of the defendant, but on appeal the trial court was 
reversed and the original was reinstated. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Supreme Court 
B u r g d o r f  v .  H o l m e - S h a w ,  a n d  C i t y  of S a g i n a w ,  356  Mich. 4 5 ,  
96 N.W.2d 164 (1959). 
Traffic 
DEFECT: Stop sign knocked down and not replaced by time of accident. 




a D e f e n d a n t  claimed maintenance of a s top  sign is not 
within the duty to keep/maintain. 
Court said: Maintenance of a s top  sign once installed is 
within the duty to keeplmaintain. 
RESULT: Summary judgment for defendant was reversed and remanded 
for trial, 
COMMENT: Note tha t  modern law makes a road authority liable both for 
the  fai lure to  instal l  a needed  sign and t h e  f a i l u r e  t o  
maintain it after installation. 
Supreme Court 
OfHare -v. City of Detroit, 362 Mich. 19, 106 N.W.2d 538 (1960). 
All -
DEFECT: Unlighted barricade at road work site, muddy road surface in 
front of barricade. 
ACCIDENT: Motorcyclist ,  riding i n  heavy rainstorm at night, went 




Plaintiff claimed the city was negligent in failing to take 
action to protect travelers when it knew the flares had 
gone out, and in leaving dirt on the road. 
Court said: The city knew that flares tended to go out in 
rainstorms, and the police officer who discovered that the 
flares had gone out had railroad flares that would not go out 
in the rain, but did not use them or take any other action. 
These facts were sufficient to permit the jury to find that 
the city was negligent. 
Whether the city was negligent in permitting dirt to remain 
on the road so that it became slippery, was a question of 
fact for the jury's decision. 
Defenses 
D e f e n d a n t  c l a i m e d  t h a t  t h e  m o t o r c y c l i s t  was 
contributorily negligent. 
Court said: Since the motorcyclist was killed at the scene, 
he will be presumed not to have been negligent. He was 
entitled to assume that the street was reasonably safe. The 
evidence in this case created a question of fact for the jury. 
RESULT: Jury verdict for plaintiff was affirmed. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Supreme Court 
Rytkonen v. City of Wakefield, 364 Mich. 86, 11 N.W.2d 63 (1961). 
All -
DEFECT: Street light pole-unspecified defect causing it to break. 
ACCIDENT: Plaint iff, an employee of def endant1s contractor, was painting 





Defendant claimed tha t  i t s  duty to  keep/maintain 
extended only to travelers along its highways and not to 
persons such as plaintiff who were employed to work on 
the highway. 
Court said: Defendant's duty to keep/maintain extends to 
any person injured by defendant's breach of that duty. 
The s tatute  does not restrict the types of persons to whom 
the duty is owed, but rather defines the standard by which 
defendant's duty is to be measured, that is, reasonable repair 
and reasonably safe and convenient for public travel. 
RESULT: Dismissal of plaintiff's case was reversed and the case was 
remanded for new trial. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Supreme Court 
Mechay v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 576, Ill N.W.2d 820 (1961). 
Maint 0' Permits, Traffic 
DEFECT: Excavation in street by utility company-fresh cement filled 
the excavation to between 2 and 6 inches from the surface 
of the pavement-barricade placed but knocked down shortly 
before the accident. 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff  driving a motor scooter ran into the excavated 





Court said: Even though only ten minutes passed between 
the knocking down of the  bar r icade  and the  acc ident ,  
defendant city had notice of the condition of the road from 
the time that the excavation was begun. 
Testimony at trial indicated that barricades placed during the 
course of the excavation were frequently knocked down a t  
night, 
Defendant claimed that the barricade in place prior to 
the time of the accident was sufficient protection as a 
matter of law. 
Court said: Whether the barricade was sufficient protection 
for the excavation was a question of fact for the  jury's 
decision. 
Defendant claimed tha t  plaintiff  was contributorily 
negligent in failing to see the excavated portion of the 
street before running into it. 
Court said: Plaintiff was entitled to assume the road was 
reasonably safe and that a warning would be given if it were 
not. 
Plaintiff was driving between 18 and 20 mph and there is no 
allegation of this speed being excessive. 
Testimony at trial indicated that the street was covered with 
a large amount of debris for which plaintiff was required to 
keep a lookout. 
Testimony indicated t h a t  t h e  s t r e e t  was shady. 
Considering the  above factors,  w h e t h e r  p la in t i f f ' s  f a i l u r e  t o  
see t h e  e x c a v a t i o n  b e f o r e  runn ing  i n t o  i t  was contributory 
negligence, was a question of f a c t  for t h e  jury's decision. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff in the  amount of $2,500 was affirmed. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Supreme Court  
Walsh v. Consumers  Power Company, and City of Saginaw, 365 Mich. 253, 
~ 2 ~ . 2 d  448 (1961). 
DEFECT: Hole approximately thirty-six inches in circumference in a 
crosswalk on defendant's street. 




No proximate cause 
Court said: Defendant's argument, that the overwhelming 
weight of the evidence established that plaintiff's injuries 
derived from being "kicked violently by an assailantft rather 
than from a fall on account of the alleged defect, was an 
issue of credibility to be determined by the trier of fact and 
will not be disturbed on appeal. 
Defenses 
No notice 
Court said: Generally, whether a defect has existed for 
such a period of time and under such circumstances that the 
defendant is deemed to have notice of it, is a question of 
fact for the jury's decision. 
In this case, plaintiff's evidence of notice was based on the 
fact that city employees often used the crosswalk and on an 
opinion by an expert witness who examined the  hole 
sometime after the accident that the hole had existed for 
three to six months prior to the data of the accident. This 
evidence was sufficient to permit the trier of fact to f i n d  
that defendant had notice. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Supreme Court 






D e f e n d a n t  c l a i m e d  t h a t  p la int i f f ' s  failure t o  provide the  
60-day s t a t u t o r y  n o t i f i c a t i o n  b a r r e d  pla int i f f ' s  suit--in 
r e s p o n s e  p la in t i f f  c l a i m e d  t h a t  the  lawsuit was based on 
nuisance,  and  t h a t  t h e  60-day s t a t u t o r y  n o t i f i c a t i o n  
r e q u i r e m e n t  appl ied only t o  c l a i m s  under  t h e  highway 
liability statute.  
Court said: The  60-day s t a t u t o r y  no t i f i ca t ion  is required 
for all c l a i m s  f o r  ''bodily injuryt1 and pla int i f f ' s  f a i l u r e  t o  
provide i t  bars his suit. 
RESULT: Dismissal of plaintiff's complaint was affirmed. 
COMMENT: N o t e  t h a t  t h e  60-day n o t i f i c a t i o n  r e q u i r e m e n t  has been 
replaced with a 120-day n o t i f i c a t i o n  r e q u i r e m e n t ,  and t h a t  
p la int i f f ' s  fa i lure  t o  provide notification will not bar the  suit 
unless defendant is actually prejudiced. 
Supreme Court  
Boike -v. City of Flint, 374 Mich. 462, 132 N.W.2d 658 (1965). 
Maint. -
DEFECT: Large chuckhole in defendant's street. 
ACCIDENT: Plaint i f f  walked across  t h e  s t r e e t  a t  night ,  stepped in the 
chuckhole and fell. 
INJURY: Unspecified. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Defenses  
D e f e n d a n t  c l a i m e d  i t  should be pe rmi t t ed  t o  present  
evidence of i t s  rou t ine  m a i n t e n a n c e  p r o c e d u r e s  a n d  
difficulties in keeping up its streets. 
Court said: Evidence of rout ine  procedures  is i r r e l evan t ,  
In addition, t h e  evidence t h a t  was presented indicated that 
the hole had been in place for up to six months,  Plaint i f f ' s  
only obl igat ion is t o  prove notice or establish the existence 
of the defect for more than 30 days. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $5,000 was affirmed. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Court of Appeals 
Sable v. City of Detroit, 1 Mich. App. 87, 134 N.W.2d 375 (1965). -
Maint. -
DEFECT: Broken sidewalk. 
ACCIDENT: Elderly woman fell on the sidewalk. 
INJURY: Fractured hip and other "serious injury." 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Defenses 
Defendant claimed plaintiff's statutory notification of 
defect failed to indicate on which of the four corners of 
the intersection in question the plaintiff had fallen and 
that therefore, the notification was insufficient and 
plaintiff's suit was barred. 
Court said: The purpose of the statutory notification is not 
only to permit the defendant to investigate the plaintiff's 
claim but to confine the plaintiff to a specific point where 
the injury was to have occurred. 
Since plaintiff's notification fails to specify which corner of 
the intersection was involved, it is insufficient and the suit 
is barred. 
It is unimportant that defendant had no difficulty in finding 
the defect and making the repairs nor does it matter that 
defendant was able to repair the alleged defect. 
RESULT: Summary judgment for defendant was affirmed. 
COMMENT: Note that modern cases hold that substantial compliance with 
the notification requirement is acceptable; ambiguity in some 
part of the notification can be corrected by clarity in other 
parts; and failure to provide the notification at all will bar 
plaint iff's suit only if defendant is prejudiced. 
Court of Appeals 
Dempsey v. C i t y  4 Mich. App. 150, 144 N.W.2d 684 (1966). 
Maint. 
DEFECT: Illegally parked car on city street. 





Court said: Defendant city is liable for injuries caused by 
its negligent failure to remove obstructions on its road, 
Defenses 
Plaintiff failed to provide 60-day notification of injury as 
required by statute. 
Court said: Plaint i ff ' s  failure to provide the written 
notification bars the suit. 
RESULT: Dismissal of plaintiff's suit was affirmed on appeal. 
COMMENT: Note that the 60-day statutory notification requirement has 
been replaced with 120-day statutory notification requirement, 
and that the present rule is that failure to provide adequate 
notice will not bar plaintiff's suit unless defendant is actually 
prejudiced. 
Supreme Court 
Kowalczyk v. Bailey, and City of St. Clair Shores, 379 Mich. 568,  
153 N.W.2d 660 (1967). 
Traffic 
DEFECT: Unspecified failure of traffic signal controlling intersection 
of county road and state trunk line. 




Defendant city and defendant road comrnision claimed 
governmental immunity. 
Court said: Both defendants are immune from liability for 
defects on state trunk Line highways. 
RESULT: Summary judgment for defendants was affirmed. 
COMMENT: Although both defendants were immune from suit based on 
highway liability the court noted that the claim against 
defendant city, that the failure of city police to remain on 
the scene after noticing the malfunction of the light and 
doing nothing to protect or warn the traffic except to notify 
the road commission, made out a sufficient charge of 
common law negligence against the city for police inaction. 
Suoreme Court 
Po ielarski v. City of Warren and Macomb County Road Commission, 380 
h 5 8  N.W.2d 491 (1968). 
Maint Po) Traffic 
DEFECT: Dead-end road-no sign or barrier indicating the end of the 
road; unspecified obstacle placed at the end of the road by 
adjacent property owner, 




Defendant claimed its duty to keeplmaintain did not 
include an obligation to install guardrails or t r a f f i c  
control devices. 
Court said: D ef endantfs duty to keep/maintain goes beyond 
the preservation of the status quo and defendant has an 
affirmative duty to design, construct, and keep the road 
reasonably safe and convenient for public travel. 
As part of its duty, defendant is required to provide devices 
warning of special danger such as the margins of the road or 
the end of the road. 
Whether defendant's failure to provide such devices is a 
breach of its duty to keeplmaintain is a question of fact for 
the jury's decision. 
Since defendant's duty to keeplmaintain applies to "flagrant 
defects," whether the failure to install warning devices or 
barriers at a terminating road amounts to a "flagrant defectu 
is also a question of fact for the jury's decision. 
A jury would be justified in concluding that a road that 
abruptly ends without warning had not been constructed or 
kept in a reasonably safe manner, 
RESULT: Summary judgment for defendant was reversed and the case 
was remanded for trial. 
- 
COMMENT: The rule that a defect must be f7flagranttf is no longer valid. 
Court of Appeals 
Mullins v. County of Wayne, 16 Mich. App. 365, 168 N.W.2d 246 (1969). 
Maint. -
DEFECT: Accumulation of ice in depression in sidewalk. 




Plaint i f f  claimed that  defendant was negligent in 
permitting the accumulation of ice  to  occur in the 
depression. 
Court said: If the underlying depression was a defect, then 
plaintiff may r e c o v e r  f o r  an in ju ry  caused  by an 
accumulation of ice  in it. Whether it is a defect is a 
question of fact for the jury's determination. 
RESULT: Summary judgment for defendant was reversed and the case 
was remanded for a new trial. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Court of Appeals 
Pappas v. City of Bay City, 17 Mich. App. 745, 170 N.W.2d 306 (1969). 
Maint. 
DEFECT: Unmarked T-intersection 
ACCIDENT: Muddy water from chuckhole splashed onto windshield thereby 
obscuring vision--subsequent collision with t ree as plaintiff 
drove through intersection. 
INJURY: Multiple fractures and head injury-blindness. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Defenses 
Defendant claimed plaintiff failed to comply with 60-day 
statutory notification requirement and, therefore, suit is 
barred. 
Court said: Sixty-day statutory notification, as applied to a 
minor incapacitated by the injury, violates constitutional 
guarantees of due process of law and is therefore void. 
RESULT: Dismissal of plaintiff9 complaint was reversed and the case 
was remanded for trial. 
COMMENT: Note that 60-day notification provision has been replaced 
with 120-day n o t i f i c a t i o n  p rov i s ion ,  which i s  he ld  
constitutional, but which will not bar plaintiff's suit unless 
defendant is actually prejudiced. 
Supreme Court 
Grubaugh v. C i t y  384 Mich. 165, 180 N.W.2d 778 (1970). 
All - 
DEFECT: Unspecified--"defec t ive sidewalkf1 running beside s t  a t e  
trunkline highway. 





C o u r t  sa id :  Municipalities retained jurisdiction over 
sidewalks adjacent to state trunkline highways subject to the 
paramount jurisdiction of the state over the trunkline highway. 
Defendant claimed plaintiff was contributorily negligent as 
a matter of law. 
Court said: Whether plaintiff was contributorily negligent is 
a question of fact for the jury's decision. 
D e f e n d a n t  c l a imed  plaintiff  did not comply with 
requirement of sending notification of injury. 
Court said: Plaint if fls notification was sufficiently precise, 
especially where defendant did not have difficulty locating 
the defect--use of phrase "defective sidewalku is acceptable 
as some degree of ambiguity may be clar i f ied b y  o ther  
aspects . 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $5,000 affirmed. 
COMMENT: Note that state's jurisdiction over the principal roadway did 
not eliminate municipality's jurisdiction (hence liability) in 
adjacent structure (sidewalk) subject to local control. 
Court of Appeals 
Jones v. City of Ypsilanti, 26 Mich. App. 574, 182 N.W.2d 795 (1970). -
Traffic 
DEFECT: Improper repair, positioning, reflectorizing of stop sign; 
failure to erect warning sign in advance of stop sign. 





Court said: Defendant has a duty to place and maintain 
stop signs in a manner making travel reasonably safe. 
Installation and maintenance of traffic control devices is 
included in the duty to keep/maintain. 
Defenses 
Defendant claimed stop signs a re  not part  of the  
improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular 
travel. 
Court said: Devices controlling the flow of traffic are an 
integral part of the improved portion of the highway and 
directly relate to the duty to keep/maintain. 
RESULT: Summary judgment for defendant was reversed and the case 
was remanded for new trial. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Court of Appeals - - 
Lynes v. St. Joseph County Road Commission, 29 Mich. App. 51, 
185 N.W.2d 1ll (1970). 
Permit, Traffic 
DEFECT: Air vent in sidewalk by abandoned police s ta t ion  guarded by 
a railing along the abandoned building. 
ACCIDENT: Child played on sidewalk by the  vent,  s a t  a t  i t s  edge, was 




a Breach of duty to keep/maintain reasonably safe sidewalks. 
Court said: Whether v e n t  and i t s  g u a r d i n g  m a d e  t h e  
sidewalk unsafe and unfit  for travel was a question of fact 
for the jury's decision. 
Proximate cause 
Court said: Whether the dangerous condition was the cause 
of the  boy's injury was a question of f a c t  for  t h e  jury ' s  
decision, and the  fact that another force (pushing by another 
child) brought about the harm would not relieve defendant  of 
liability. 
RESULT: Summary judgment for defendant was reversed and the case 
was remanded, 
COMMENT: N/A 
Court of Appeals 
Hooks v, City of Detroit, 31 Mich. App. 662, 187 N.W.2d 901 (1971). 
Eng., Maint, -
DEFECT: Shoulder of road six inches lower than the pavement. 
ACCIDENT: Pla in t i f f ,  t ravel ing a t  a speed of 60-65 mph, left the 
pavement and on attempting to return, lost control when 




Defendant claimed the shoulder of the road was not on 
the  improved portion of the  highway designed for  
vehicular travel. 
Court said: Shoulders are designed for vehicular travel, 
although differently than the paved portion of the highway, 
and defendant is obligated to maintain them in reasonable 
repair as adjuncts of the paved portion of the highway. 
Whether this duty of reasonable maintenance has been 
discharged depends on the extent and location of the six-inch 
height differential, and plaintiff's use of the shoulder. All 
these are factual matters for the juryss decision. 
RESULT: Summary judgment for defendant was reversed and the case 
was remanded for trial. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Court of Appeals 







D e f e n d a n t  claimed tha t  because 60-day s t a t u t o r y  
notification was not verified it was, therefore, inadequate 
and plaintif fts suit was barred. 
Court said: If the only defect in the statutory notification 
is lack of verification under oath, the statutory requirements 
have been met. 
RESULT: Accelerated judgment for defendant reversed and remanded 
for further proceedings. 
COMMENT: Note that 60-day statutory notification requirement has been 
replaced with 120-day statutory notification requirement, and 
t h a t  the present rule is that failure to provide adequate 
notice will not bar plaintiff's suit unless defendant is actually 
prejudiced. 
Court of Appeals 
Re nolds v. Board of County Road Commissioners of Clare County, 34 
M h p .  468, 191 N W . Zd 503 (1 971). 
Eng., Traffic 
DEFECT: Road on bridge over open drain--sidewalk beside the road, 
part ia l ly  guarded to prevent pedestrian access to drain 
terraces . 
ACCIDENT: Child left walkway of bridge, walked over drain terraces, and 




Plaintiff claimed defendants had a duty to erect barriers 
to prevent pedestrian access to the drain terraces. 
Court sa id :  The duty to keeplmaintain includes the 
erection of railings and barriers. 
Both the road commission (which designed the bridge) and 
the city (which later took control of the  bridge) had a 
continuing obligation to correct any defective design. 
Defendants must an t ic ipa te  pedestrian depar ture  from 
established walkways and maintain a safe condition where 
people may reasonably be expected to walk. 
Whether the  absence of a pedestrian barrier caused the 
injury was a question of fact for the jury's decision. 
Defenses 
e No jurisdiction over the bridge (Road Commission) 
Court said: Transfer of jurisdiction from road commission 
to city does not relieve road commission of duty to correct 
defec t ive  design--lapse of t ime between t r ans fe r  of 
jurisdiction and accident is a factor to be considered but 
does not necessarily break the chain of causation. 
Defendants claimed that in departing from the established 
walkway plaintiff became a trespasser and, therefore, not 
included within their duty to keeplmaintain, 
Court said: Since defendants knew or should have known 
that children used drain terraces as a walkway, it does not 
matter whether plaintiff was a trespasser. 
No notice 
Court said: Considerable testimony at trial that pedestrians 
used the terraces as shortcuts established that defendants 
knew or should have known of the use of the drain for that 
purpose. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed. 
COMMENT: Note that transfer of jurisdiction did not relieve road 
commission of responsibility for an alleged design defect. 
Note that the injured person was a child, eight years of 
age 
Court of Appeals 
Har is v. City of Dearborn Heights, 34  Mich. App. 594, 192 N.W.2d 44 
Ti&. 




ISSUES: D e f e n s e s  
Immunity 
Court said: T h e  d o c t r i n e  of sovere ign  immuni ty  protects 
defendants from suit for f a i lu re  t o  k e e p  d e e r  f r o m  cross ing  
the  highway. 
RESULT: Summary judgment for defendant was affirmed. 
COMMENT: This is t h e  only c a s e  in  w h i c h  t h e  c o u r t  h a s  u s e d  t h e  
d o c t r i n e  of sovere ign  i m m u n i t y  t o  avoid liability for a road 
authority. 
Court  of Appeals 
Hinton -v. S t a t e  of Michigan, 34 Mich. App. 663, 192 N.W.2d 74 (1971). 
Maint. -
DEFECT: Hole in sidewalk. 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff slipped and fell. 
INJURY: Serious and permanent injuries to right ankle and both knees. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Defenses 
Defendant claimed that statutory notification was not 
sufficiently specific as to location of defect. 
Court said: Defendant experienced no difficulty in locating 
the alleged defect from the notification provided, and has 
shown no e v i d e n c e  of pre judice  on account of any 
deficiencies in the notification. 
I t  is not necessary to comply literally with the statute. 
Substantial compliance is sufficient. Neither the failure to 
specify the nature of the injury nor the failure to provide 
names of witnesses makes the notification invalid. 
  he principal purpose of the statutory notification is to 
permit defendant to investigate the claim while "evidentiary 
t r a i lv  is still fresh and to correct a problem that might 
cause injury to another person in the future. Inability to 
correct the problem before a subsequent injury, however, 
would not necessarily mean that plaintiff's suit should be 
barred. 
RESULT: Summary judgment for defendant was reversed and case was 
remanded for trial. 
COMMENT: The s t a t u t e  requires the  injured person to notify the 
responsible agency, within 12 0 days, of the injury sustained, 
the exact location and nature of the defect, and the names 
of witnesses. Failure to provide this notification, however, 
will not bar the claim unless the defendant is prejudiced by 
i t .  
Court of Appeals 
Husse v. City of Muskegon Heights, 36 Mich. App. 264, 193 N.W.2d 421 (mil? 
Eng., Maint. -
DEFECT: Three consolidated cases-unspecified. 
ACCIDENT: 1. Vehicle swerved out of control and collided with a tree. 
2 ,  Three people injured when car went out of control and 
overturned a number of times. 
3 ,  Plaintiff and five-year-old child injured when car went 
out of control, rolled over, and collided with a tree and 
boulder. 
INJURY: Unspecified in all three cases. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Defenses 
Defendant claimed that in all three cases the plaintiffs 
failed to provide the 60-day notification required by 
statute and that therefore the claims were barred. 
Court said: The 60-day notification requirement as applied 
to minors violates constitutional due process guarantees and 
is therefore void. 
As to the other plaintiffs, the 60-day notification provision 
arbitrarily divides the class of injured persons into the  
vict ims of public negligence and the victims of private 
negligence and allows to the victims of private negligence a 
longer period of t ime in which to sue. Therefore, the 
provision is unconstitutional. 
RESULT: Accelerated judgment for defendant was reversed and the 
cases were remanded for trial, 
COMMENT: Note tha t  the  60-day notification requirement has been 
replaced by a 120-day notification requirement, which is 
constitutional, and that the present rule is that failure to 
provide adequate notice will not bar a plaintiff's suit unless 
the defendant is actually prejudiced. 
Suprem e Court 
Reich -v. State Highway Department, 386 Mich. 617, 194 N.W.2d 700 (1972). 
Maint. -
DEFECT: Stalled car in center lane of street. 
ACCIDENT: Police officers came on the scene and after being told their 
help was not needed, left. Plaintiff came to assist driver of 
stalled vehicle, positioned his car to face stalled car, and 
. stood between the cars to attach jumper cables. Stalled car 
hit from behind and pushed forward into plaintiff who was 
trapped between the two vehicles. 
INJURY: Amputation of right leg above the knee. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Negligence 
Plaintiff claimed defendant city had a duty to  remove 
obstructions such as stalled vehicles from its streets. 
Court said: Defendant's duty to keep its streets safe and 
fit for travel includes removing traffic obstructions. 
Breach 
Court said: Whether the failure of the police officers to 
assist in removing the traffic obstruction was a breach of 
defendant's duty is a question of fact for the jury's decision. 
RESULT: Summary judgment for defendant city was reversed and the 
case was remanded. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Court of Appeals 
Harr v. Crabill, and City of Muskegon, 41 Mich. App. 642, 200 N.W.2d 
460 3 1972); 56 Mich. App. 378, 223 N.W.2d 745 (1974). 
Maint. -
DEFECT: Tree beside road. 
ACCIDENT: Tree fell onto plaintiff's car. 
INJURY: Said to be severe. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Defenses 
8 Defendant claimed the tree was not on the improved 
portion of highway designed for vehicular travel. 
Court said: Since the tree fell onto the highway and since 
the point of impact was on the highway, liability occurred on 
improved portion of highway designed for vehicluar travel. 
Defendant has an obligation to remove hazards from side of 
road. 
No notice 
Court said: Complaints of area residents about potential 
danger of falling trees is sufficient to permit jury to decide 
whether there was notice. 
RESULT: Summary judgment for defendant reversed and the case was 
remanded for new trial. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Court of Appeals 
Miller v. Oakland County Road Commission, 4 3  Mich. A p p .  215, 
m w . 2 d  141 (1972). 
Traffic 
DEFECT: Traffic signal controlling intersection; green in all directions. 
ACCIDENT: Intersectional collision. 
INJURY: Unspecified for one plaintiff; for second plaintiff: severe 
brain damage, partial paralysis, vision, locomotion, and 
speech impairments, severe psychiatric problems. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Negligence 
Defendant claimed that traffic signals are not included 
within its duty to keeplmaintain. 
C o u r t  sa id :  The duty t o  keep/maintain includes the 
maintenance and repair of traffic signals. 
Defendant claimed that a finding that the traffic signal 
was green in all directions was contrary to the weight of 
the evidence. 
Court said: Each party presented evidence on this point. 
The issue was therefore a question of fact and since there is 
some evidence to support the finding of the trial court, it 
will not be disturbed on appeal. 
Damages 
Court said: While the size of the verdict in this case is 
"precedent shattering,!' in view of the plaintiff's lifelong 
severe problems and in view of the presence of evidence 
sufficient to support the verdict, it will not be set aside. 
Defenses 
Notice 
Court  s a i d :  Whether defendant's evidence of periodic 
maintenance rebutted plaintiff's claim of prior notice was a 
question of fact. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $1,200,000 was 
affirmed, 
COMMENT: The case reports that defendant introduced the following 
evidence to rebut the contention that the light was green 
in all directions: 
- The absence of entries in repair records indicating the 
existence or repair of the claimed condition, 
- The physical impossibility of the  control device 
displaying green in all directions, 
- Its records showing reasonable periodic maintenance 
and prompt repair. 
The case reports that plaintiff introduced the following 
evidence in support of the contention that the light was 
green in all directions. 
- Prior malfunctions of the same type based on the 
testimony of several witnesses. 
- Prior reports of the claimed condition by a gas station 
attendant on the corner to the police and instructions 
by the police to the gas station attendant to remedy 
the problem by striking the control box with a rubber 
mallet. 
- The testimony of a police officer that on the day in 
question the yellow light fl ickered and went out 
completely for several seconds but came on again and 
functioned properly thereafter. 
- The possibility that a cam might slip and stay in a 
green position causing a green light in all directions as 
other lights reach their green position. 
Su~reme Court 
~ i ' l l i a m s  v. Michigan State Highway Department, 4 4  Mich. App. 51, 
205 N.W.2d 200 (1972). 
All -
DEFECT: Unspecified failure to keep road in reasonable repair, 
ACCIDENT: Unspecified automobile accident. 
INJURY: Unspecified-two minor children, ages unknown. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Defenses 
Defendant claimed that plaintiff's use of evidence of 
subsequent repair of the road in question was improper 
and that a new trial should be ordered. 
Court said: Evidence of subsequent repair is generally not 
admissible to show negligence because it is tantamount to an 
admission of negligence and prejudices a de fendan t .  
Evidence of subsequent repair may be admitted only when 
there is a clear exception to the general rule. 
RESULT: Order by the trial judge vacating a jury verdict for plaintiff 
and ordering a new trial was affirmed. 
COMMENT: Case turns largely on evidentiary rules rather than principles 
of road liability. 
Court of Appeals 
Grawey v. Board of Road Commissioners of the County of Genesee, 48 
Mich. App. 742, 211 N,W,2d 68 (1973). 
Eng., Traffic 
DEFECT: Signing at freeway exit ramp said to be improper. 
ACCIDENT: Car entering highway via exit ramp collided head-on with 
plaintiff's car. 




Court  said: Duty to keeplmaintain includes signing and 
warning motorists at points of special danger. 
Plaintiff claimed design of the intersection and improper 
signing of the exit ramp caused the accident. 
Court said: Defendant not only complied with requirements 
of MMUTCD, but added additional signing as well. 
Plaint if frs evidence did not show that increased signing would 
have prevented the car from entering via the exit ramp. 
RESULT: Judgment for defendant was affirmed. 
COMMENT: Note that defendant not only followed MMUTCD but put up 
additional signs to account for peculiarities of the ramps. 
Court of' Appeals 
National Bank of Detroi t  v. State of Michigan, 51 Mich. App. 415, 
215 N.W.2d 599 (1974). 
DEFECT: Unspecified defects in the road surface of a s ta te  trunkline 
highway. 




No jurisdiction, even though defendant contracted to 
maintain the highway on behalf of the state. 
Court said: The s ta te  highway department does not divest 
itself of jurisdiction by contracting with another agency for 
maintenance of its highways. The road commission here has 
not been delegated jurisdiction over the road and, therefore, 
cannot be liable to the plaintiff. 
RESULT: Accelerated judgment for defendant was affirmed. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Supreme Court 
M O  e r  v .  Wayne County Road Commission, 5 2  hqich. App. 285, 
h . 2 d  53 (1974). 
Traffic 
DEFECT: Improper function of traffic light due to malfunction in 
circuitry connecting the traffic light with adjacent railroad 
signals. 
ACCIDENT: Unspecified automobile accident at intersection of two state 




No jurisdiction--even though defendant undertook the 
maintenance and repair of the traffic light in question. 
Court said: Since the state had jurisdiction over the roads 
in question, the statute imposes liability only on the s tate  
and the traffic light in question is not within the scope of 
the city's responsibility and jurisdiction. 
RESULT: Summary judgment for defendant was affirmed. 
COMMENT: The court noted that if local units of government were not 
absolved of liability for maintenance on s tate  trunkline 
highways they would be less likely to undertake it on behalf 
of the state. 
Court of Appeals 
Bennett v. City of Lansing, 52 Mich.App. 289, 217 N.W.2d 54 (1974). 
Traffic 
DEFECT: Traffic lights controlling intersec tion--timing insufficient to 
permit trucks either to stop or to clear intersection during 
amber and prior to green showing for opposing traffic. 




Defendant claimed that the timing of light was within the 
intervals permitted by statute and MMUTCD. 
Court said: Mere compliance with discretionary limits is 
not sufficient to discharge the duty to  keep/maintain.  
Defendant must take account of peculiarities of intersections 
controlled by its devices and in particular must account for 
- the varying distances that different types of vehicles (trucks 
as well as cars) require in order to stop before entering an 
intersection or to clear intersection after entrance. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed. 
COMMENT: Def endantts own witnesses stated that nearly 3,000 trucks per 
day passed through the intersection and that this traffic was 
not specifically figured into timing cycles. 
Court of Appeals 
Fraley v. City of Flint, 54 Mich. App. 570, 221 N.W.2d 394 (1974). 
Maint. -
DEFECT: Absence  of snow f e n c e s  o r  o t h e r  b a r r i e r s  t o  p r e v e n t  t h e  
accumulation of snow on t h e  highway, 




P l a i n t i f f  c l a i m e d  tha t  the  failure t o  e rec t  snow fences or 
other barriers t o  prevent t h e  accumulation of snow on t h e  
highway was negligent design. 
Court said: Whether defendant's d u t y  t o  k e e p  t h e  highway 
i n  a c o n d i t i o n  r e a s o n a b l y  s a f e  a n d  f i t  f o r  t r a v e l  was 
breached by i ts  failure t o  e rec t  snow fences, is a q u e s t i o n  of 
f a c t  for t h e  jury's decision. 
RESULT: Summary judgment for defendant was  r e v e r s e d  and  t h e  case 
was remanded. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Court  of Appeals 
W e c k l e r  v. B e r r i e n  C o u n t y  R o a d  C o m m i s s i o n ,  5 5  M i c h .  App .  7 ,  
222 N.W.2d 9 (1974). 
Eng., Maint. -
DEFECT: Blunt end guardrail in median of freeway--apparently the 
o r i g i n a l  p lans  fo r  t h e  highway itself  or the  design 
specification for the guardrail called for the installation of 
an extension rail at the blunt end, but the extension rail was 
not installed. 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff 's  vehicle struck the blunt end of the guardrail, 
which penetrated the vehicle and partially ejected plaintiff 
from it. 




Court said: The defendant is not an insurer-the plaintiff 
must prove that the alleged defect caused his damages. 
Considerable expert testimony in this case supported the trial 
court's conclusion that the defendant's failure to install the 
extension guardrail caused the plaintiff's injury-on appeal 
this finding will not be disturbed. 
Defenses 
a Defendant claimed tha t  the  median was not on the 
improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular 
travel. 
Court  sa id :  The median and i t s  devices a re  on the 
improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular 
travel-the median does not "magically" appear but is the 
defendant 's  creat ion;  the  guardrail  was des igned t o  
defendant's specification and installed by its contractors-the 
median, though not designed for use in the same fashion as 
the principal travel lanes, is like the shoulder and control 
devices. 
The highway is thus the composite of many features all of 
which make up the improved portion of the highway designed 
for vehicular travel, and the statute is not to be read as 
creating liability only for the paved travel lanes. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $944,068.35 was 
affirmed. 
COMMENT: Case contains considerable reporting of expert testimony of 
the problems presented by an exposed blunt end guardrail and 
the benefits of an extension guardrail in reducing accident 
severity preventing accidents. 
Court of Appeals 
Detroit ~ a i k  and Trust Company v, State of Michigan, 55 Mich. App. 131, 
222 N.W.2d 59 (1974). 
Eng,, Traffic 
DEFECT: S-curve--question of improper design and improper speed 
pos t ed . 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff lost control of truck on curve and was thrown from 





C o u r t  said: Defective design may lead to a continuing 
obligation to correct the defect, and liability may be based 
on negligence in failing to  correct the defect. Notice of a 
defect in design or construction is not required. 
Defenses 
S t a t u t e  of Limitations--plaintiff  said his claim was 
founded on nuisance and therefore the three-year s ta tute  
of limitations should apply, and not the two-year statute 
of limitations. 
Court said: The case is not founded on nuisance, therefore 
the two-year statute of limitations applies. 
RESULT: Accelerated judgment for defendant was affirmed. Suit filed 
after expiration of statute of limitations. 
COMMENT: Case contains  considerable  discussion of the law of 
nuisance. 
Note that modern law requires the plaintiff always to 
prove notice, even when the defendant created the defect. 
Court of Appeals 
Stremler v, M i c h i f f a n  58 Mich. App. 620, 
228 N.W.2d 492 (1975). 
Traffic 
DEFECT: Guardrail by shoulder of the  road leading to  a bridge 
abutment. 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff's vehicle blown off the road by a "gust of windt1 
became tfimpaled on the guardrailff and crashed into the  
bridge abutment. 
INJURY: Two deaths and two "serious injuries." 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Defenses 
Defendant claimed that guardrails on the shoulder were 
not on the improved portion of the highway designed for 
vehicular t ravel  and tha t ,  therefore, defendant was 
immune from suit. 
Court said: Guardrails on a shoulder are on the improved 
portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel and 
defendant is therefore not immune from suit. 
RESULT: Summary judgment for defendant was reversed and the case 
was remanded for further proceedings. 
COMMENT: The court noted that the jury could find that a guardrail was 
defective when an automobile striking it would travel down 
it into a bridge abutment; the court also noted that the jury 
could find that ?'wind or some other not unlikely eventff could 
cause an automobile to hit the guardrail. From these two 
facts the jury could find that the defective guardrail was the 
proximate cause of the accident. 
Court of Aooeals 
Van Liere .;. Michigan State Highway Department, 59 Mich. App. 133, 
229 N.W.2d 369 (1975). 
All - 
DEFECT: Negligent design, construct ion,  and m a i n t e n a n c e  of 
intersect ion. 




Defendant claimed that plaintiff's failure to file the 
statutory notification within the one-year period required 
by the Court of Claims Act barred the suit. 
Court said: Highway claims are governed by the two-year 
s ta tute  of limitations in the general highway statute, not by 
the one-year notice provision in the Court of Claims Act. 
RESULT: Accelerated judgment for defendant was reversed and the 
case was remanded for further proceedings. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Court of Appeals 
Kerkstra v. State  of Michigan, 60  Mich. App. 761, 231 N.W.2d 521 (1975), 
affirmed398 Mich. 103, 247 N.Mf.2d 759 (1976). 
a., Traffic 
DEFECT: Guardrail leading off an entrance ramp improperly designed, 
constructed, installed, and maintained, 




Defendant claimed that this case was controlled by the 
six-month notification provision of the Court of Claims 
Act ,  and since plaintiff had not filed the notification 
within the required period, the claim was barred. 
Court said: The case is controlled by the general highway 
s t a t u t e ,  not t h e  Court  of Claims Ac t .  T h e  60-day  
notification requirement of the general highway statute is 
unconstitutional, and therefore the claim is subject only to 
the two-year s ta tute  of limitations. Since the claim was 
filed within the two-year s ta tute  of limitations, it is not 
barred. 
RESULT: Accelerated judgment for defendant was reversed and the 
case was remanded for further proceedings. 
COMMENT: Note the  60-day notification requirement of the general 
highway statute has been replaced by a 120-day notification 
requirement . The requirement is constitutional but failure to 
comply with it will not bar plaintiff's suit unless defendant is 
actually prejudiced. 
Court of Appeals 







Defendant city claimed that plaintiff's suit was filed after 
the expiration of the two-year s tatute  of limitations and 
therefore was barred--in response, plaintiff claimed that 
the two-year statute of limitations for sui ts  against 
governmental units was a denial of equal protection and 
due process of law as guaranteed by the Constitution. 
Court  sa id :  For the  legislature to require a two-year 
statute of limitations for suits against governmental units, 
but require a three-year s tatute  of limitations for suits 
against other entities, is not a violation of constitutional 
guarantees of due process and equal protection. 
RESULT: Accelerated judgment for defendant was affirmed, 
COMMENT: The  court noted tha t  the  purpose of a s t a t u t e  of 
limitations is to prevent stale claims and put an end to 
fear of litigation. 
The court observed that the purposes of the statutory 
not if icat ion requirements a re  to  provide t i m e  t o  
investigate and to appropriate funds for settlement. 
Court of Appeals 
Dillon v. Tamminga, and City of Kalamazoo, 64 Mich. App. 301, 236 
N.W.2d 716 (lm- 
All -
DEFECT: "Defective road maintenance." 




e Defendant claimed that plaintiff had not complied with 
the six-month notification provision of Court of Claims 
Ac t  and tha t ,  therefore ,  the  suit  was barred. In 
response, plaintiff claimed that the suit was governed 
only by the  general highway statute, the notification 
provision of which was unconstitutional,  and t h a t  
therefore ,  only the  two-year s t a t u t e  of limitations 
controlled the case. 
Court said: Even though the notification provision of the 
general highway law is constitutionally defective, plaintiff 
must still comply with the notification provision of the Court 
of Claims Act. Failure to comply, however, will bar the 
suit only if defendant is actually prejudiced. 
RESULT: Accelerated judgment for defendant (state) was reversed and 
the case was remanded for further proceedings. 
COMMENT: Note that the case interprets the Court of Claims Act, but 
otherwise follows the standard principles of road liability. 
Court of Appeals 
Hanger v. 's tate of Michigan and St. Clair County Road Commission, 64 
Mich. App. 572, 236 N.W.2d 148 (1975). 
Traffic 
DEFECT: Inadequate signalization-absence of traffic light. 
ACCIDENT: In tersec t ional  collision between two cars--fog and mist 




Defendant was within the  discretion allowed by the 
MMUTCD in not install ing t r a f f i c  l i g h t  p r io r  t o  
undertaking careful studies at the location. 
Court said: One week before accident, defendant's own 
engineer had determined the inadequacy of signalization at 
the intersecton and had ordered lights installed, but the work 
order was never carried out. Failure to carry out its own 
work order clearly makes the defendant negligent. 
RESULT: Judgment for defendant was reversed and new trial was 
ordered for dam ages. 
COMMENT: The case shows the rare circumstance in modern times in 
which an appellate court overturns the findings of fact  
made by the trial court. 
Case contains much specific design data concerning the 
intersection in question. 
Supreme Court 
Tuttle -v. Department of State Highways, 397 Mich. 44, 243 N.W.2d 244 
(1976). 
Maint. -
DEFECT: Ice on sidewalk, formed by refreezing of melted snow piled 
beside the sidewalk by property owner. 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff slipped and fell on the ice. 
IN JURY: Unspecified. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Negligence 
Plaintiff claimed defendant city was negligent in failing 
to keep the sidewalk free of ice. 
Court  said: The mere presence of snow and ice is not 
sufficient. The city is liable only for a de fec t  in the  
sidewalk itself. 
RESULT: Summary judgment for defendants was affirmed. 
COMMENT: In this case, the City of Owosso was a co-defendant with 
the property owner, Brenner. 
Court of Appeals 
Woodworth v. Brenner, and City of Owosso, 6 9  Mich. App. 27'3, 
244 N.W.2d 446 (1976). 
Eng. 
DEFECT: Negligent design and construction of bridge over s t a t e  
trunk1 ine. 




Defendant claimed that the case was required to be filed 
within one year, under the Court of Claims Act. 
Court said: Road liability cases are governed by the road 
liability statute, which allows two years to file suit, 
Defendant claimed plaintiff failed to notify i t  of the 
injury within 120 days, and therefore, plaintiff's claim was 
barred. 
Court sa id :  Plaintiff 's  failure to notify the defendant 
within 120 days will not bar the suit unless defendant is 
actually prejudiced. 
Court of Appeals had declared the 120-day notification 
provision unconstitutional. 
Supreme Court said: The 120-day notification provision is 
constitutional. 
RESULT: Accelerated or summary judgment for defendant reversed and 
remanded for trial. 
COMMENT: Note tha t  the  plaintiff in this case did not provide any 
notice: instead, she filed suit seventeen months after the 
accident. 
Su~reme Court 
~ o b b s  v. Michigan  S t a t e  Highway Depar tment ,  398 Mich. 9 0 ,  
247 N.W.2d 754 (1976). 
Maint. -
DEFECT: Chuckhole covered with snow on s tate  road maintained by 
county under contract with state. 





Defendant claimed it was not liable because the road was 
under the jurisdiction of the state. 
Court said: Even though the county was negligent in 
maintaining the s tate  road, it is not liable when it has no 
jurisdiction over the road. 
RESULT: Judgment for defendant was reversed and the  case  was 
remanded for new trial. 
COMMENT: In this case the court did not allow the defense to be raised 
because the defendant had waited too long to assert it. 
Court of Appeals 
Robinson -v. Emmet County Road Commission, 7 2  Mich. App. 623,  
251 N.W.2d 90 (1976). 
DEFECT: Flooding on highway; drain inadequate to  handle a "not 
unusualw rainfall. 





Court  said: Plaintiff must always prove notice of the 
defect, but for defect in design and construction, notice of 
spec i f ic  flooding is not required. Notice of design or 
construction defect leading to flooding is sufficient. 
Notice could be inferred from the knowledge of the Wayne 
County Road Commission employees on the site since the 
defendant  had contracted with the road commission for 
maintenance of the highway, and the defendant would be 
responsible for the knowledge of its contractors even though 
there was no evidence of actual communication of the prior 
floodings. 
Notice could also be proven by the defendant's possession of 
rainfall statistics, design plans, and construction records from 
which it could have determined the adequacy of the drain 
system. 
RESULT: Judgment for defendant was reversed and new trial ordered. 
COMMENT: Note the influence of defendant's own records on proving 
notice. 
The court also noted the presence of police and general 
notoriety of flooding at the site. 
Note tha t  t he  road commission that maintained the 
highway was not sued, but that the knowledge of i t s  
employees was attributed to the State. 
Supreme Court 
Peters v. State Highway Department, 400 Mich. 50, 252 N.W.2d 799 (1977). 
All -
DEFECT: ''Defective conditiontt of highway. 




D e f e n d a n t  c l a i m e d  p la in t i f f ' s  f a i l u r e  t o  n o t i f y  of t h e  
injury within 120 days bars t h e  suit. 
Court s a i d :  Fa i lu re  t o  comply with the  120-day notification 
provision will bar t h e  suit only on proof of a c t u a l  p r e j u d i c e  
t o  de fendan t .  T h e r e  is no e v i d e n c e  of ac tual  prejudice t o  
defendant in this case, 
D e f e n d a n t  c la imed tha t  since t h e  highway liability s t a t u t e  
limits claims to "bodily injury,'' t h e  plaintiff's c l a i m  based  
on  t h e  d e a t h  o f  h e r  h u s b a n d  a n d  c h i l d r e n  w a s  n o t  
included in t h e  statute.  
Court s a i d :  T h e  s t a t u t o r y  t e r m  ''bodily injuryt1 includes  
bodily injuries resulting in death. 
RESULT: S u m m a r y  judgment  and  a c c e l e r a t e d  judgment for defendant 
was reversed and case was remanded for further proceedings. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Court  of Appeals 
Phelps v. S t a t e  of Michigan, 75 Mich. App. 442, 254 N.W.2d 923 (1977). 
Maint -09 Traffic 
DEFECT: Several: intersection between road and railroad--speed limit 
sign improperly placed; overhead light out; snow on road; 
trees obscuring view of oncoming train. 
ACCIDENT: Collision between plaintiff's vehicle and train. 
INJURY: Child passenger killed; driver suffered severe injuries. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Negligence 
Defendant road commission claimed the trial court 
erroneously instructed the jury that it could consider the 
failure to salt or sand roadway as negligence when it was 
covered only with a natural accumulation of snow. 
Court said: Evidence of salting and sanding was presented 
as a defense by the defendant and no objection to the  
instruct ion was made a t  the time of trial. Therefore, 
defendant road commission cannot complain about the  
instruction on appeal. 
Plaintiff claimed that the placement of a 45 mph speed 
sign 280 feet beyond the 1/2 mile maximum established by 
the MMUTCD, and between the advance warning sign and 
the railroad, was confusing. Defendant claimed that the 
violation of the  manual was not relevant since the 
purpose of the MMUTCD requirements was to confirm the 
speed control. 
Court  sa id :  Violation of the MMUTCD regulation was 
evidence of negligence. The purpose of the regulation did 
not matter. 
Defendant road commission and defendant railroad claimed 
that the evidence concerning the placement of speed limit 
signs, warning signs, the absence of flashing lights, and 
visual obstructions, as well as evidence of prior accidents, 
permitted only conjecture as to the proximate cause of 
the accident. 
C o u r t  s a i d :  This evidence was suff icient  to  prove 
proximate cause, 
RESULT: Judgment for defendant Detroit Edison and judgment for 
plaintiffs against defendant road com mission and defendant 
railroad all were affirmed. 
COMMENT: 0 The railroad crossing in question was protected by a 
reflectorized crossbuck rather than a flashing light. 
Defendant Detroit Edison was responsible for the overhead 
lighting, but the influence of the light being out was not 
discussed in the case. 
Plaintiff's car was seen to be skidding as it approached 
the railroad crossing. 
Evidence of prior accidents was admitted to show notice 
of the dangerous nature of the intersection. 
Court of Appeals 
Martin v. ~ n n  Arbor Railroad, Detroit Edison Company, and Washtenaw 
County Road Commission, 76 Mich. App. 41, 255 N.W.2d 763 (1977). 
DEFECT: Unspecified holes, defects, and depressions in the surface of 
a state trunk line highway. 
ACCIDENT: Trailer disengaged from truck, crossed the center line, and 
crashed into plaintif fls vehicle. 
INJURY: Two deaths. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Defenses 
a Defendant argued that highway liability claims are limited 
to bodily injury and therefore do not include death. 
Court said: Highway liability claims include claims for 
bodily injury resulting in death. 
Defendant claimed that plaintiff's suit was controlled by 
the Wrongful Death Act only. 
Court said: The purpose of the Wrongful Death Act was to 
clarify the law regarding lawsuits on behalf of deceased 
persons and it does not prohibit claims for highway-related 
deaths. Claims for highway-related deaths are  properly 
brought under the highway liability law. 
RESULT: Summary judgment for defendant was reversed and the case 
was remanded. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Court of Appeals 
Pagano v. State of Michigan, 76 Mich. App. 569, 257 N.W.2d 172 (1977). 
Maint. -
DEFECT: Fallen tree lying on county road within city limits. 
ACCIDENT: Collision between motorcycle and fallen tree--stormy weather. 
INJURY: Said to be serious and permanent, 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Defenses 
No jurisdiction (defendant city). 
Cour t  said: County roads, even within a c i ty ,  remain 
entirely within the jurisdiction of the county. Plaintiff's 
argument of "two-tiered" or "layeredv jurisdiction involving 
both the city and county road commission is rejected. 
RESULT: Directed verdict for defendant city was affirmed. 
Judgment for defendant road commission was reversed. 
COMMENT: Judgment for the road commission was reversed for reasons 
u n r e l a t e d  t o  i ssues  of road liability--improper jury 
instructions had been given on the issue of contr ibutory 
negligence. 
Court of Appeals 
Summerville v. Board of County Road Commissioners of the County of 
Kalamazoo and City of Portage, 77 Mich. App. 580, 259 N.W.2d 206 (1977). 
Eng., Traffic 
DEFECT: Railroad crossing-allegations of inadequate signing and 
fai lure  to  en ter  into "clear vision area agreementff by 
defendant road commission and defendant railroad. 
ACCIDENT: Collision between vehicle and train. 
INJURY: Eight deaths-four children and four adults. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Negligence 
Defendant railroad claimed that the drivers negligence 
was the sole proximate cause of the plaintiff's damages. 
Court said: An examination of the record indicates that 
the contributory negligence of the driver was a question of 
fact for the juryfs decision. 
Defendant railroad claimed the verdict was excessive. 
Court said: Since there is some evidence supporting the 
verdict and since there is no evidence of passion or bias, the 
verdict is not excessive. 
Since the verdict does not shock the judicial conscience, it is 
not excessive. 
Defendant railroad commission claimed that it had no 
duty to enter into a flclear vision area agreement" with 
defendant railroad and therefore it cannot be negligent 
for failing to do so. 
Court said: The law provides procedures that road agencies 
can use to enter into clear vision agreements with railroads, 
but the procedure does not create an obligation on the part 
of road agencies to do so. 
Defendant's duty to keep/rnaintain does, however, extend to 
clear vision areas even though they lie beyond the improved 
portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel. Clear 
vision areas, like traffic control devices, are an integral part 
of the improved portion of the highway. 
A jury could consider the failure to enter into a clear vision 
agreement as negligence. 
Defendant road commission claimed that it had no duty 
t o  i n s t a l l  a d d i t i o n a l  p r o t e c t i v e  devices at t h e  s i t e  or t o  
reduce t h e  speed l i m i t  a long  t h e  highway s i n c e  i t  a l o n e  
was not authorized by law t o  do so, 
Court said: S i n c e  t h e  i n s t a l l a t i o n  a n d  m a i n t e n a n c e  o f  
t r a f f i c  c o n t r o l  d e v i c e s  a r e  inc luded  in defendant ' s  duty t o  
k e e p l m a i n t a i n ,  t h e  jury  could  cons ider  as n e g l i g e n c e  i t s  
f a i l u r e  t o  u s e  e s t a b l i s h e d  p r o c e d u r e s  in c o n j u n c t i o n  wi th  
other public agencies t o  i m p r o v e  t h e  signing o r  r e d u c e  t h e  
speed limit. 
RESULT: J u d g m e n t  f o r  p l a i n t i f f  in  t h e  a m o u n t  of $1,250,000 was 
affirmed. 
COMMENT: N o t e  t h a t  t h e  d u t y  t o  k e e p l m a i n t a i n  i n c l u d e s  v i s ib i l i ty  
p r o b l e m s  t h a t  are b e y o n d  t h e  i m p r o v e d  p o r t i o n  of t h e  
highway designed for vehicular travel. 
Court  of Appeals 
C r y d e r m a n  v. Soo  L i n e  R a i l r o a d  C o m p a n y  a n d  C h i p p e w a  County  Road 
Commission, 78 Mich. App. 465, 260 N.W.2d 135 (1977). 
Eng., Maint. 
DEFECT: Three consolidated cases: 
1. Drainage excavation during an unspecified construction 
project. 
2 .  Depression at the edge of a road. 
3. Exposed manhole cover in street. 
ACCIDENT: 1. Plaintiff drove his car into the excavation. 
2 .  Car feu into the depression. 
3. Plaintiff tripped and fell while crossing the street. 
INJURY: All three unspecified. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Defenses 
Two-year s t a t u t e  of l imi ta t ions  expired in all three 
cases--plaintiffs claim t h a t  t h e  two-year s t a t u t e  of 
limitations for actions against the government violates 
constitutional guarantees of equal p ro t ec t i on  when a 
three-year statute of limitations applies to actions against 
private persons. 
Court said: The two-year s t a tu te  of limitations for suits 
against public agencies does not v io l a t e  cons t i t u t i ona l  
guarantees of equal protection. 
RESULT: Accelerated judgment for defendant affirmed in all three  
cases. 
COMMENT: Case contains considerable discussion of legal principles 
applicable to constitutional challenges based on equal  
protection of law. 
Cour t  no tes  t h e  following advantages to a two-year 
statute of limitations: 
- Plaintiffs will promptly investigate their claims and 
promptly commence their suits 
- Promptness is especially important when governments 
are continually beginning new highway improvement 
programs 
- Government agencies can estimate their financial 
obligations with some degree of certainty 
- The potential liability of road authorities is greater 
than that forced by private parties, so it is proper 
that the time period of this exposure be shorter 
Supreme Court 
Forest -v. Parmalee, 402 Mich. 348, 262 N.W.2d 653 (1978). 
Maint Traffic -*' -
DEFECT: Unmarked T-intersection. 
ACCIDENT: Muddy water from a chuckhole splashed onto windshield, 
obscuring vision and causing plaintiff to pass through the 
intersection and strike a tree. 
INJURY: Multiple fractures and head injury-blindness. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Negligence 
Defendant claimed that  evidence showing the absence of 
accidents should have been admitted. 
Court said: The absence of accidents cannot be used to 
show that an intersection was safe. 
Defendant claimed that  the MMUTCD should not have 
been admitted. 
Court said:  The MMUTCD is admissible to show that signs 
to make a T-intersection more safe were available. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed. 
COMMENT: This case involved an appeal from a retr ial  following the  
supreme court's decision, summarized at page 117. 
Court of Appeals 
Grubaugh v. City of St. Johns, 82 Mich. App. 282, 266 N.W.2d 791 (1978). 
DEFECT: Snowpile on sidewalk. 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff crossing snowpile slipped and fell against adjacent 
fence. 
INJURY: Broken wrist. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Negligence 
Plaintiff claimed defendant village had a duty to remove 
ice and snow from the sidewalk. 
Cour t  said: The mere presence of ice and snow is not a 
defect that will give rise to liability. 
When the  ice  and snow a r e  the  result of an unnatural 
accumulation and it presents an "unusual or except ional  
interference with travel," the defendant can be held liable 
for failure to remove it. 
The snow and ice  accumulation in this case could have 
resulted from the defendant's plowing operation and thus was 
an unnatural accumulation that should have been removed in 
order to keep the walkway "reasonably safe and convenient 
for public travel.!' 
Defenses 
No notice 
Cour t  said: Evidence in  this case showed the snowpile in 
place two days before plaintiff's accident; defendant's agents 
plowed the adjacent s t reet ,  and the sidewalk was along a 
main thoroughfare. Thus, a jury could infer  t h a t  t h e  
accumulation was present long enough for the city to have 
known of its existence and to have removed it. 
a Defendant claimed the sidewalk was not a public way.. 
Court said: Sidewalk was adjacent to a public highway and 
was therefore a public way. 
Defendant claims verdict was excessive. 
Cour t  said: Verdict is not excessive since it does not shock 
the judicial conscience-plaintiff continues to experience pain 
and  s t i f f n e s s  in h e r  hand--plaintiff is a deaf mute, and her 
ability t o  communicate with sign language is impaired by t h i s  
injury. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff in t h e  amount of $55,000 affirmed. 
COMMENT: The Village of Yale was a codefendant wi th  Master  P r o d u c t s ,  
Inc., the  property owner. 
Court  of Appeals 
H a m p t o n  v. M a s t e r  P r o d u c t s ,  Inc., and  Vi l lage of Ya le ,  84 Mich. App. 
767, 270 N.W.2d 514 (1978). 
Maint. -
DEFECT: Uneven section of sidewalk. 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff tripped on sidewalk. 




Court said: The plaintiff must prove actual notice or after 
at least some evidence from which a jury could infer that 
the defect was sufficiently long standing or notorious for the 
defendant to have known about it. In this case the only 
evidence of notice offered was photographs of the sidewalk 
area proving only the  d e f e c t  a t  t he  t ime of the  fa l l .  
Therefore, there is no evidence of the legally required notice 
and for the jury to give a verdict for plaintiff was improper. 
RESULT: The jury returned a verdict in the amount of $20,000 for the 
plaintiff, which the judge refused to accept. The judge 
en te red  judgment for the defendant, and on appeal was 
affirmed. 
COMMENT: Case i l lustrates  the rare event in modern times of a 
judge refusing to accept a jury verdict and being upheld 
on appeal. 
Note tha t  t he  resu l t  is determined by the complete 
absence of evidence showing notice rather than fTsomeu 
evidence. 
Court of Appeals 
Beamon v. City of Highland Park, 85 Mich. App. 2 4 2 ,  271 N.W.2d 187 
(1978). 
Eng. 
DEFECT: Highway median guardrail too low to prevent vehicle from 
vaulting into opposite lanes. 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff driving somewhat in excess of the  posted speed 
limit,  swerved to avoid traffic slowdown, struck curb, vaulted 
the median and collided with opposing traffic. 
INJURY: Unspecified-said to be serious. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Negligence 
Elements of design and construction defect--trial court 
and Court of Appeals said that  liability for negl igent  
design or construction required proof that the defect in 
question was f7flagrant.ff 
Court said: All that is required is that plaintiff show that 
the defect made the highway not reasonably safe  and f i t  for 
travel. It is not required that plaintiff show that the defect 
in design or construe tion was ffflagrantff or vfdangerous.lf 
RESULT: Judgment  fo r  defendant  was reversed and the case was 
remanded for new trial. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Supreme Court 
Arnold v. S ta te  Highway Department, 406 Mich. 235,  277 N.I"J2d 627 
0
Enff., Maint -* 9 Traffic 
DEFECT: Ice on bridge over s ta te  highway--caused by "preferential" 
icing due to cold weather conditions. 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff drove over the bridge, lost control of the car, and 
crashed. 
INJURY: Said to be serious--one plaintiff rendered quadriplegic until 
death thirteen months afterwards. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Negligence 
Defendant claimed that the icing in question was the 
result of natural weather conditions r a t h e r  than any 
defect in the structure itself. 
Court said: The evidence indicates that: 
- it is impossible to predict when this kind of icing will 
occur 
- the icing can occur suddenly and almost instantaneously 
- without full time surveillance of the bridge there is no 
a s s u r e d  method for immediately de tec t ing  this  
condition and defendant cannot be held to so stringent 
a standard. 
Therefore, the trial court's finding that the accident was due 
to defendant's inadequate methods of handling t h e  icing 
condition is clearly erroneous. 
Duty 
Court said: It is clear that defendant's duty includes the 
placing of warning signs or other safeguards warning of 
danger. There was conflicting testimony as to whether a 
"Watch For Ice On Bridge" sign was visible to motorists. 
Therefore, the trial court's finding that the sign was not 
visible to motorists is also not clearly erroneous and will be 
upheld. 
RESULT: Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed. 
COMMENT: N o t e  t h a t  d e f e n d a n t  could  no t  be found liable for a natural  
a c c u m u l a t i o n  of i c e  b u t  c o u l d  b e  f o u n d  l i a b l e  f o r  n o t  
warning about it. 
Court of Appeals 
G r e e n l e a f  v. D e p a r t m e n t  of S t a t e  Highways and Transportation, 90 Mich. 
App. 277, 282 N.W.2d 805 (1979). 
Eng., Maint. -
DEFECT: Narrow refuge lane on freeway. 
ACCIDENT: Plaint i f f  was struck by passing truck as he wakled from 





Plaint i f f  c laimed t h a t  the highway was defectively 
designed in that refuge lane was too narrow. 
Court said: A 9 112 foot wide refuge lane does not amount 
to negligent design. 
Defenses 
Defendant claimed, and the trial court found, that the 
plaintiff was contributorily negligent. 
Court said: This finding of fact wi l l  not be disturbed on 
appeal. 
Plaintiff claimed that contributory negligence was not a 
defense because the defendant breached a statutory duty 
to make the roads safe. 
C o u r t  sa id :  Even though a road authori ty 's  duty is 
expressed in a statute,  contributory negligence is s t i l l  a 
defense. 
RESULT: Judgment for defendant was affirmed. 
COMMENT: The court noted that the comparative negligence rule did not 
apply to this case because it was tried before the Placek 
decision adopted comparative negligence. 
Court of Appeals 
Wade -v. State of Michigan, 9 2  Mich. App. 234, 284 N.W.2d 522  (1979). 
Maint Traffic * '  -
DEFECT: Ice on bridge on freeway. 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff's car skidded on "preferential icen on bridge and 




Pla in t i f f  c la imed  t h a t  t h e  de fendan t  failed to give 
adequate warning of preferential icing. 
Court said: The duty to maintain reasonably safe  roads 
includes the duty to post signs and warn motorists a t  points 
of special danger. The "Watch for Ice on Bridge" sign is not 
adequate, since preferential icing is not visible, the sign is 
not  i l lumina ted ,  and i t  gave  no instructions as to  the 
appropriate action for the driver to take. 
Defenses 
Notice 
Court s a i d :  The defendan t  had notice of the regular 
possibility of preferential icing based on predictable seasonal 
conditions. 
The defendant claimed the plaintiff was contributorily 
negligent. 
Court said: The defendant should have been allowed to 
develop this argument at trial. 
RESULT: The c a s e  was affirmed on all issues except contributory 
negligence and was remanded for a trial limited to that issue. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Court of Appeals 
S a l v a t i  v .  D e p a r t m e n t  of S t a t e  Highways, 92 Mich. App. 252, 
285 N.W.2d 326 (1979). 
All -
DEFECT: Ice on bridge. 
ACCIDENT: Plaintiff's car slid out of control and was hit by another 
vehicle. 
INJURY: One fatality, two f'serious" injuries. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Defenses 
a Defendant S t a t e  Highway Department  claimed that 
jurisdiction was solely with the county road commission. 
Court  sa id :  There is a genuine issue of f a c t  as to 
jurisdiction in this case, and it should be decided at trial. 
I t  is possible for both the s ta te  and the county to have 
jurisdiction over the road, 
RESULT: Summary judgment for the s ta te  was reversed and the case 
was remanded for trial. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Court of Appeals 
Hiner v. State  of Michigan, State Highway Commission, and Macomb 
County Road Commission, - Mich. App. -7 - N.W.2d -9 (1980). 
All - 
DEFECT: Ice on railroad tracks at intersection with road. 
ACCIDENT: Truck became struck and was hit by train. 
INJURY: Loss of arm, burns and permanent scarring. 
LEGAL 
ISSUES: Defenses 
e Defendan t  S t a t e  Highway Depa r tmen t  claimed that  
jurisdiction was solely with the county road commission. 
Court  said:  The re  is a genuine  issue  of f a c t  as to 
jurisdiction in this case, and it should be decided at trial. 
I t  is possible for the state to have jurisdiction over the road, 
concurrent with the county's jurisdiction. 
RESULT: Summary judgment for the s t a t e  wasreversedand thecase  
was remanded for trial. 
COMMENT: N/A 
Court of Appeals 
Stricker v; - ~ i c h i ~ a n  Department of S ta te  Highways and Transportation 
and Macomb C o u n t y  R o a d  C o m m i s s i o n ,  - Mich .  App. -7 
N.W.2d . (1980). 

